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Overview 
 
Part  one  of  the  thesis  reviews  the  literature  on  whether  antisocial  personality 
disorder (ASPD) and psychopathy represent distinct categories. This question was 
addressed by identifying studies with populations of individuals meeting criteria for 
ASPD and exploring the samples in terms of other constructs. Studies are divided 
into four areas; cluster analytic studies, studies of emotional processing, theory of 
mind and mentalizing, and executive functioning. The review suggests that those 
who meet criteria for ASPD represent a heterogeneous group, and that psychopathy 
is distinct from ASPD. 
 
Part  two  consists  of  an  empirical  paper  which  measures  the  constructs  of 
mentalizing and psychopathy in a sample of people with and without diagnoses of 
antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) or borderline personality disorder (BPD). This 
allowed  for  the  testing  of  the  mentalizing  deficit  theory  of  BPD,  to  explore 
mentalizing in an ASPD sample, and also to explore the construct of psychopathy, 
which has been used interchangeably with ASPD. BPD has also been suggested to 
be a phenotypic expression of psychopathy. Results supported a mentalizing deficit 
in BPD, and support the premise that ASPD is a heterogeneous group, and consists 
of at least two subtypes. The implications of findings in the context of a paradigm 
shift away from categorical towards a dimensional model of personality disorder are 
discussed,  along  with  the  limitations  of  the  study  and  implications  for  future 
research. 
 
In part  three a critical appraisal of the research process is presented. Issues of 
research  in  the  probation  setting,  risk  and  ethical  issues  of  working  with  this 
population, and also the practicalities of working alongside a large scale research 
project are discussed, in order to guide future research in this area. 
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Abstract 
 
Aims  
This systematic literature review addresses the question of whether 
Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) exist as two distinct 
disorders, or whether they represent different points of one continuum. 
Method 
PsycINFO, EMBASE and MEDLINE databases were searched for studies 
spanning the past decade up until 31
st March 2014 in order to select studies to be 
included in the review. PsycEXTRA was also searched, within the same time frame, 
in order to explore the grey literature. In total 12 studies were selected for review.  
Results 
The studies suggest that those scoring highly on measures of psychopathy 
seem to be unique from other ASPD offenders in terms of emotional processing, 
comorbid psychopathology, risk of violence, neuropsychological factors and 
structural differences in certain brain regions.  
Conclusion 
The diagnostic category of ASPD seems to encompass a heterogeneous 
group of people. These findings call for careful use of the diagnosis of ASPD and 
have implications for the use of the diagnostic category in terms of risk assessment, 
treatment planning, and access to services. 
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1. Introduction  
People given a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), broadly 
speaking,  are  those  who  repeatedly offend from  a  young age, are  irresponsible, 
impulsive  and  lack  remorse.  It  is  estimated  that  around  4.1%  of  the  general 
community in the United States meet criteria for a diagnosis of ASPD, and in the 
general British population, a prevalence of between 0.3 and 1.1% has been reported 
(Coid et al., 2006). British and American prison populations are estimated to have 
around a 10 times higher incidence of ASPD in comparison to community samples 
(Fazel & Danesh, 2002).  Clearly a diagnosis of ASPD represents a significant cost 
to  the  individual,  their  friends,  family  and  colleagues,  and  to  the  healthcare  and 
criminal justice systems. It has been associated with increased risk of recidivism and 
therefore is a heavy influence on criminal justice pathways. Given the association of 
ASPD with poorer treatment outcomes, it is often used as an exclusion criterion in 
mental health services, restricting access to treatment for those given the diagnosis. 
Stigma  continues  to  surround  the  diagnosis,  despite  the  publication  of  the 
government document, “Personality Disorder: No Longer a Diagnosis of Exclusion” 
(Snowden  &  Kane,  2003).  The  implications  both  to  society,  and  the  lifelong 
implications to those labelled with ASPD highlight the importance of examining the 
diagnostic construct and how it is used.            
  As part of the revision of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (4th edition, text 
revision, American Psychiatric Association, 2000) in preparation for DSM-5 (APA, 
2013),  a  working party  was formed  which  considered  a  revision  of the  way  that 
personality  disorders  were  classified  (e.g.  Widiger  &  Simonsen,  2005).  Many 
proposed  changes  were  discussed,  such  as  the  creation  of  the  category 
“antisocial/psychopathic  prototype”  (Hesse,  2010).  For  personality  disorder  in 
general, a move was proposed away from the ten categories of personality disorder 
towards a dimensional model of personality pathology (Krueger et al., 2011).  This is 
reflective of the work of leading theorists such as Joel Paris, who proposed that 9 
 
borderline personality disorder (BPD) and classic psychopathic presentations may 
represent  different  points  of  the  same  continuum  (Paris, 1997),  and  of  professor 
Jeremy  Coid,  who  suggested  that  psychopathy  represents  the  end  point  of  a 
continuum of antisocial personality pathology (Coid & Ullrich, 2010).   
  A  set  of  guidelines  for  the  assessment  and  treatment  of  ASPD  were 
produced  by  the  National  Institute  for  Health  and  Care  Excellence  (NICE) 
summarized  by  Kendall  et  al.  (2009).  They  highlight  those  scoring  highly  on 
psychopathy screening measures as being of high risk to others and as having a 
“lifelong  disability”.  NICE  were  pessimistic  about  the  treatability  of  the  group  of 
people encompassed in the ASPD guidelines. The guideline has been criticized for 
its reification of a potentially heterogeneous group (Pickersgill, 2009). Potentially, as 
the literature reviewed here explores, a wide range of people are being grouped 
together and labelled as “untreatable”, which highlights the importance of reviewing 
this  area  of  the  literature.  Perhaps  those  at  the  higher  end  of  a  spectrum  of 
constructs such as psychopathy are responsible for the assumption that ASPD is 
difficult to treat. The guidelines recommend that severity of ASPD is assessed using 
the Psychopathy  Checklist-Revised  (PCL-R,  Hare,  2003),  which  is  a  measure of 
psychopathy. Therefore the guidelines seem to imply that ASPD and psychopathy 
are one and the same. Critiques of the guideline highlight that later in the document 
they are in fact treated as separate entities, citing the research finding that only a 
small  proportion  of  those  meeting  criteria  for  ASPD  also  meet  criteria  for 
psychopathy (Pickersgill, 2009). 
1.1 Psychopathy                
  The  apparent  confusion  in  the  ASPD  guidelines  as  to  whether  this  is  a 
disorder distinct from psychopathy, is symbolic of a debate spanning the last two 
centuries  (Arrigo  &  Shipley,  2001).  The  “psychopath”  was  first  described  by 
Cleckley,  who  described  a  syndrome  characterised  by  behavioural,  interpersonal 10 
 
and affective  symptoms,  such  as  antisocial behaviour, deceit and  insincerity and 
lack  of  remorse.  Cleckley’s  book,  “the  mask  of  sanity”  described  how  these 
symptoms were “masked” by features such as “good intelligence, superficial charm, 
lack  of  delusions,  lack  of  irrational  thinking,  and  an  absence  of  neuroticism” 
(Cleckley,  1982).  This  definition  was  later  refined  and  empirically  validated  by 
Robert Hare, who developed what continues to be the gold standard in measuring 
psychopathy,  the  PCL-R.  Psychopaths  were  described  by  Hare  as  “human 
predators  who  coldly,  callously,  and  ruthlessly  use  charm,  deceit,  manipulation, 
threats, intimidation, and violence to dominate and control others and to satisfy their 
own selfish needs and desires” (Hare & Hart, 1993).        
  There  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  those  rating  highly  on  measures  of 
psychopathy are distinct from other “antisocial” individuals. More recent explorations 
of  the  construct  of  psychopathy  have  moved  away  from  a  focus  on  behavioural 
factors  towards  a  neurodevelopmental  and  cognitive  aetiology  (Blair,  1995).  The 
Integrated  Emotions  System  (IES)  model  incorporates  the  fear  recognition  and 
amygdala dysfunction theories of psychopathy (Blair, Mitchell & Blair, 2005). The 
fear recognition theory is supported by research that shows inferior performance in 
facial  emotion  recognition  paradigms  in  both adults and  children  rating  highly  on 
psychopathic  traits  (Dadds  et  al.,  2006)  and  in  patients  with  amygdala  damage 
(Adolphs, 2002). A failure to recognize distress in others leads to a failure of the 
normal  process  of  inhibition  of  behaviours  which  cause  distress  in  others  via 
classical  conditioning  (the  violence  inhibition  mechanism,  or  VIM),  leading  to  a 
failure to develop the moral emotions, such as empathy. The IES model describes 
three neural networks, interacting with the central (CeN) and basolateral nuclei of 
the amygdala (Blair et al., 2005). Rather than a single causal impairment, as in the 
VIM theory, separable pathways are proposed by the IES which are responsible for 
different  types  of  conditioning.  This  explains  why  in patients  with a  lesion  to  the 
CeN, aversive conditioning may be absent but instrumental learning remains intact 11 
 
(Blair, 2005). The unique symptomatology of psychopathy could be understood, in 
terms of the IES, as a disruption in the pathology of these neural networks. This 
provides  an  explanation  of  the  deficiency  in  moral  socialisation,  underdeveloped 
empathy and antisocial behaviour/aggression which is characteristic of psychopathy.
  Evidence  supports  psychopathy  as  a  construct  unique  from  general 
antisocial  pathology.  Elevated  levels  of  instrumental  aggression  have  been 
observed  in  this  group  (Blair  et al.,  2004;  Marsh  &  Blair, 2008).  Psychopaths  in 
general  are  at  a  greater  risk  of  violent  behaviour  (Cooke,  Michie,  Hart  &  Clark, 
2005). In forensic populations, research suggests that psychopathic individuals are 
more likely than non-psychopathic offenders to violently reoffend soon after release. 
One  study  found  that  psychopaths  actually  had  a  higher  rate  of  recidivism  after 
treatment in a Canadian therapeutic community, whereas non-psychopaths showed 
some improvement (Hobson, Shine & Roberts, 2000). Psychopaths may also start 
offending at an earlier age in comparison to other non-psychopathic offenders (De 
Brito, Viding, Kumari & Blackwood 2013).          
  Although there is a history of theorising about subtypes of psychopathy, only 
relatively recently have these been studied empirically. Cluster analytic studies of 
offenders have repeatedly identified subgroups within psychopaths that map on to 
primary and secondary psychopathy (Hare, 1991; Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen 
&  Krueger,  2003;  Marcus,  Fulton  &  Edens,  2013).  The  “primary  psychopath” 
describes Cleckley’s classic cold, callous, unemotional, low-anxious psychopath. In 
contrast, it is postulated that secondary psychopaths engage in antisocial behaviour 
as  a  result  of  negative  internal  states  such  as  anxiety  and  guilt  and  have  been 
described as having a low tolerance to stress, being prone to irritability and worry, 
thus expressing more reactive aggression (Karpman, 1948 cited in Blackburn, 1975; 
Lykken, 1995). Three (Cooke & Michie, 2001) and four (Hare, 2003) factor models 
of psychopathy have also been proposed.            
  The  PCL-R  remains  the  “gold  standard”  in  the  diagnosis  of  psychopathy, 12 
 
which  incorporates  the  primary  and  secondary  factors  described  above.  For  the 
purposes of this review the concepualisation of “psychopathy” that is ascribed to is 
that  which  is  described  by  the  PCL-R,  which  is  commonly  used  in  the  studies 
described. In order to meet criteria for “psychopathy”, sufficient criteria (depending 
on  the  cut-off  score used)  must be  met  on  both  primary  and  secondary factors. 
There  is  of  course  the  possibility  that  more  than  two  factors  exist,  or  that 
psychopathy may be better conceptualised as a dimensional construct. This will be 
informed by the following review of the literature. 
1.2 Antisocial Personality Disorder          
  Cleckley’s  description  of  a  glib,  low-anxious,  insincere  and  superficial 
psychopath was criticised for being based largely on unobservable, unmeasurable 
traits. In the DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) these features formed 
the  bases  of  the  description  of  Antisocial  Personality  Disorder  (ASPD).  Primary 
features  were observable,  behavioural  characteristics  like  criminality, delinquency 
and irresponsibility. This was in turn criticised as these criteria arguably describes a 
large majority of the prison population and thus has lead to a vast number of people 
who engage  in persistent  criminal or  antisocial behaviour  to be  labeled  with  this 
diagnosis. It could be argued that as a result one diagnostic category may include a 
very heterogeneous group. When the PCL –R was administered to 80 inmates, of 
which half met the criteria for ASPD, only 12.5% met the criteria for psychopathy 
(Hare, Hart & Harpur, 1991).               
  In order to distinguish what differentiates ASPD as a diagnosis as opposed 
to  someone  who  engages  in  criminal  behaviour  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the 
developmental aetiology of personality disorder. Table 1 lists the features that must 
be present in order to give a diagnosis of ASPD. Conduct disorder must have been 
present  prior  to  the  age  of  18,  however  not  every  adolescent  that  engages  in 
antisocial behaviour goes on  to  develop  ASPD.  For  a  diagnosis of  a personality 13 
 
disorder to be given these features must affect functioning in different domains and 
be  prevalent  across  the  lifespan.  A  toxic  combination  of  biochemical,  genetic, 
autonomic and environmental factors elevate the risk of conduct disorder, which, 
given a permissive environment, adverse life circumstances, and through processes 
such  as  social  learning  can  go on  to  develop  into  ASPD,  which  is one of  many 
developmental trajectories (Martens, 2000). 
 
Table 1                   
DSM-IV Criteria for ASPD 
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others 
occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:  
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by 
repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest  
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others 
for personal profit or pleasure  
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead  
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or 
assaults  
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others  
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent 
work behavior or honor financial obligations  
(7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, 
mistreated, or stolen from another  
B. The individual is at least age 18 years.  
C. There is evidence of Conduct Disorder with onset before age 15 years.  
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of 
Schizophrenia or a Manic Episode. 
 
1.3 ASPD and psychopathy, distinct disorders?      
  There  is  a  divide  amongst  researchers  as  to  whether  psychopathy  and 
ASPD  should  be  considered  as  distinct  disorders,  or  whether  they  represent 14 
 
manifestations of the same disorder. Robert Hare’s development of the PCL-R was 
crucial in this debate. Studies showed that 70-80% of prisoners met the diagnosis 
for ASPD, but of those that met the criteria for ASPD only a third were classified as 
meeting the criteria for psychopathy (Widiger & Corbitt, 1995). It was argued that 
ASPD  was  capturing  many  people  who  were  merely  engaging  in  antisocial 
behaviour, and that most of these people did not possess the affective/interpersonal 
traits  seen  in  psychopaths,  which  theorists  regarded  as  an  etiologically  distinct 
subgroup (Lykken, 1995). This was supported by the finding, described above, that 
most people with a diagnosis of ASPD do not meet criteria for psychopathy. This 
evidence  seemed  to  provide  empirical  support  for  ASPD  and  psychopathy  as 
distinct categories. Henry and Moffitt (1998) warned that if we considered ASPD as 
a homogenous group, “we may be comparing apples and oranges”.  
Table 2 
PCL- R Items 
Factor  1  Interpersonal 
Affective  
Factor 2 Behavioural   Other 
 
Glibness / Superficial 
charm 
 
Superficial sense of self 
worth 
 
Pathological Lying 
 
Conning / Manipulative 
 
Lack of remorse or guilt 
 
Shallow affect 
 
Callous / lack of 
empathy 
 
Failure to accept 
responsibility 
 
Need for stimulation  / 
proneness to boredom 
 
Parasitic lifestyle 
 
Poor behavioural controls 
 
Early behaviour problems 
 
Lack of realistic goals 
 
Impulsivity 
 
 Irresponsibility 
 
Juvenile delinquency 
 
Revocation of conditional 
release 
 
Criminal Versatility  
 
Many short term marital 
relationships 
 
Sexual promiscuity 
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Whilst this could be considered as evidence that the two are distinct, others 
argue that this merely reflects differences in the sensitivity and specificity of the tools 
used to measure ASPD and psychopathy (Widiger et al., 1996). The PCL-R has 
more items and a higher cut-off score than the ASPD DSM-IV criteria, which means 
a higher level of specificity, but it remains possible that these two measures are 
identifying a cohort of people with a similar underlying disorder (Kosson, Lorenz & 
Newman, 2006).  See  Tables 1  and  2 for a  list of  the  diagnostic  criteria for both 
ASPD and psychopathy.                
  In  terms  of  differences  between  the  two  constructs,  there  is  empirical 
evidence  to  suggest  that people  scoring highly on  measures of  psychopathy  are 
unique from those who meet criteria for ASPD. They differ in terms of outcomes 
such as violent recidivism and treatment failure (Hemphill, Hare & Wong 1998). Of 
people leaving a secure psychiatric hospital, 40% violently reoffended, compared to 
a  77%  violent  recidivism  rate  in psychopathic offenders  (Harris,  Rice  &  Cormier, 
1991). The two may differ in other areas such as emotional processing (Kosson, 
Lorenz  &  Newman,  2006),  executive  functioning  (Dolan,  2012)  and  other 
neuropsychological indices such as startle response (Vaidyanathan, Hall, Patrick & 
Bernat, 2011). These, amongst others, are constructs which are used in the papers 
currently reviewed in order to investigate whether ASPD and psychopathy represent 
distinct groups. 
2. Aims                 
  Given the possibility that the predictive value of the diagnostic category of 
ASPD may be driven by those psychopathic individuals that are encompassed by 
the diagnosis, it was necessary to strictly select papers for the current review that 
separate participants into those that meet criteria for ASPD only, and those that 
meet criteria for both psychopathy and ASPD. By including studies that have 16 
 
employed this methodology to investigate differences between the two groups, this 
review aims to further clarify whether ASPD and psychopathy are distinct disorders.  
 
3. Method                 
  Keyword searches of PsycINFO, EMBASE and MEDLINE databases were 
performed. The search term “psychopath* adj10 "antisocial personality disorder" 
“and the following limits were applied: 
•  Peer reviewed journal articles 
•  Adult subjects (over 18 years) 
•  Last ten years 
•  English language 
The total number of papers from this search was 134 once duplicates were 
removed. Abstracts were read and screened and papers were selected based on 
the following inclusion criteria: 
  Empirical research studies with adult participants 
The study of antisocial behaviour in adolescents represents a vast volume of 
literature. The focus of this review is on ASPD and psychopathy, both of which 
require a minimum age of 18 for a diagnosis. 
  Must have administered measures of ASPD and psychopathy in a clinical or 
forensic population 
There is a growing body of evidence on psychopathic traits in community samples, 
but this review is concerned with how the diagnostic labels are applied in clinical and 
forensic settings, where they can have an impact on access to services. 
  Quantitative, empirical papers, not meta analyses or reviews 17 
 
The current review aims to evaluate very specific studies in order to answer a 
specific question about a clinical population, and therefore the search was limited to 
quantitative empirical papers in order to achieve greater generalizeability of findings. 
  Male participants only 
Research in this area historically has focused almost exclusively in males. There is 
evidence to suggest that psychopathy and ASPD are expressed differentially 
according to biological sex (Cale & Lilienfield, 2002). The expression of these 
conditions in females necessitates it’s own body of research and is therefore beyond 
the scope of the current review.  
  Original paper available in English 
Based on these criteria 11 papers were identified for review. The reference lists of 
all relevant papers were screened and one further paper was identified, giving a 
total of 12 to be included in this review.  
3.1 Quality appraisal                
  A quality appraisal tool, the “standard quality assessment criteria” (Kmet, Lee 
& Cook, 2004) was used in order to assess the quality of the studies selected. This 
allowed for conclusions drawn from the current review to be evaluated in terms of 
the quality of the studies from which they were drawn. The quality appraisal tool 
(see Appendix A1) includes 14 items, which are rated on a three point scale, giving 
a maximum score of 22 for each paper. The criteria covers, for example, the clarity 
of the description of the objectives of the study, methodological issues such as 
sampling and robustness of measurement tools, quality of data analysis, and 
whether the conclusions presented are actually represented in the data. Two raters 
used the tool to independently rate the papers. The two sets of scores were then 
compared, and in cases where a different rating was given, a consensus was 18 
 
agreed upon through discussion. See appendix A2 for the final ratings for each 
paper.  
 
3.2 Measures of ASPD and Psychopathy         
  The papers selected for review utilized a range of measures to assess for 
ASPD and psychopathy. The psychometric properties of each are described here. 
a) PCL-R                   
  As mentioned in the introduction section, the gold standard for the 
assessment of psychopathy is the PCL-R (Hare, 2003). The PCL-R is a 20 item 
scale (see table 2). The items are rated on a three point scale, from zero (item does 
not apply) to two (item definitely applies), for a maximum score of 40. Ratings 
should be carried out by a trained rater, based on interview and file data. As 
described in the introduction, most items load onto one of two factors (see table 2). 
Studies have suggested that the instrument has a standard error of measurement of 
about 3 points, and good test-retest and inter-rater reliability (Schroeder, Schroeder 
& Hare, 1983). These estimates are based on studies of prison samples, and 
suggest that in this population the PCL-R is a unidimensional and homogenous 
scale. It has been replicated in research that the interpersonal/affective factor has a 
higher threshold than the impulsive/antisocial factor. Different cut off scores can be 
applied in order to establish clinical levels of psychopathy, which is further discussed 
in the review. 
b) PCL-SV 
Given that the PCL-R is costly and time consuming to administer, a 
screening version was created which is particularly useful for research purposes 
(PCL-SV, Hart, Hare & Cox, 1995). The PCL-SV is a 12 item scale based on the 
PCL-R, which gives briefer criteria and requires less corroborative information to 
rate.  A cut off score of 18 is recommended for establishing psychopathy criteria. An 
item response theory approach was used to compare the PCL-SV to the PCL-R and 19 
 
results suggested that it can be considered a reliable short form of the PCL-R 
(Cooke, Michie, Hart & Hare, 1999). It correlated highly with the PCL-R even when 
administered across samples by different raters (r < .80).   
c) PPI 
The Psychopathic Personality Inventory (Lilienfield & Andrews, 1996) is an 
187 item self-report scale for assessing psychopathic personality traits. The scale 
was originally created for use in a general population, given that the PLC-R and 
PCL-SV are mostly used in offending samples. However the PPI has since been 
shown to have good internal consistency and test–retest reliability in undergraduate 
and prison samples (Lilienfield & Andrews, 1996) and has been found to correlate 
positively and significantly with the PCL-R and PCL:SV (Malterer, Lilienfield, 
Neumann & Newman, 2009).                 
d) PAI                   
  The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI, Morey, 1991) is a 344 item self-
report instrument that assesses a wide range of personality constructs. The PAI has 
good construct and discriminant validity. It includes four scales which assess for the 
validity of responses. Internal consistency of clinical scales is high with alphas in the 
.80s for clinical, student and general populations (reported in Strauss, 2006).           
e) SCID I and SCID II              
  The structured clinical interview for diagnosis of DSM-IV axis I disorders and 
axis II personality disorders are semi structured diagnostic interviews for axis-I 
disorders and axis-II personality disorders. A study of a mixed in and out patient 
sample with non-clinical controls suggested that the SCID I had moderate to 
excellent inter rater reliability (Lobbestael, Leurgans & Arntz, 2011). Reliability for 
most personality disorders, measured categorically and dimensionally, was 
excellent. Studies suggest that the SCID II has similar reliability and validity in 
comparison to other measures of DSM personality disorders but with the advantage 20 
 
of being quicker to administer (Spitzer, Gibbon, Williams, Davies, Borus & 
Rounsaville, 1995). 
 
4. Results                  
  After reading the 12 papers it was discovered that each focused on one of 
four areas; studies employing cluster analytic methodology to investigate the validity 
of the diagnostic categories, emotional processing, neuropsychological factors and 
other neurological factors. For clarity, the 12 papers were divided into these four 
areas for review. 
4.1 Clustering and subtypes of antisocial personality        
  As described in the introduction section, some argue for the existence of 
variants of psychopathy, such as primary and secondary psychopaths. A three 
factor model has also been suggested (Cooke & Michie, 2001). The studies 
reviewed here (table 3) used statistical clustering techniques to explore these 
subgroups within large forensic samples meeting the criteria for ASPD. These 
studies aimed to further refine the construct validity of these clusters by investigating 
how ASPD offenders varied in terms of many theoretically relevant and clinically 
useful variables, such as aggression, treatment outcome, and institutional 
infractions. 
A methodological strength of all of the studies in this section is their large 
sample sizes.  It can be difficult to recruit such large numbers from such a specific 
group as ASPD offenders. All participants were from either prison or court mandated 
residential drug treatment programmes, which impacts on the generalizability of 
findings to non-incarcerated populations. The first two studies, (Poythress et al., 
2010 and Cox et al., 2013) used the same sample. The SCID-II was used to identify 
691 men meeting the criteria for ASPD. The PCL-R was also administered to these 
men as a measure of psychopathy. They then selected further factors, based in 21 
 
empirically supported theory, which would help to identify whether these 691 men, 
given the diagnosis of ASPD, actually differed on meaningful variables such as 
violence, aggression, anxiety, depression, impulsivity, dominance and passive 
avoidance learning. Therapist rating scales were used to assess treatment 
motivation and progress in therapy. A methodological strength of this study was the 
use of the well validated PAI scale to provide corroboration for therapist ratings.  
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Table 3 
Studies Identifying Clusters / Subtypes of ASPD and Psychopathy 
Study  Population   Sample 
size 
ASPD / Psychopathy 
measures 
Other factors measured  Key findings 
Poythress et al. 
(2010) 
Men serving 
prison 
sentences or 
court ordered 
drug treatment 
programs in the 
US  
691 men 
with ASPD 
SCID II  
PAI 
PCL-R 
Anxiety, low mood,  
violence & aggression, 
interpersonal dominance, 
impulsivity 
passive avoidance learning, 
treatment outcome, 
institutional infractions, 
recidivism  
ASPD was a heterogeneous 
group, four clusters emerged: 
primary psychopathy, 
secondary psychopathy, non-
psychopathic ASPD, and 
fearful psychopathy 
Cox et al. (2013)  Men serving 
prison 
sentences or 
court ordered 
drug treatment 
programs in the 
US  
679 men 
with ASPD 
SCID-II 
PAI 
PPI  
As above  The PPI had discriminant 
validity in terms of the four 
clusters identified in the study 
above. Categories had 
predictive utility in terms of 
institutional misconduct 
Coid & Ullrich, 
2010 
Prisoners in 
England and 
Wales  
496  SCID I and II PCL-R 
(cut off 25) 
Comorbid psychopathology, 
demographic data, treatment 
received, criminal history 
31.8% of ASPD met criteria for 
psychopathy. Psychopathic 
ASPD more severe than ASPD 
alone in terms of comorbid PD, 
violence and antisocial 
symptoms 23 
 
Forensic records were used as a measure of institutional infractions, and follow up 
data was also gathered on offending at one year post release. These empirically 
based factors arguably have high clinical and predictive utility. If psychopathy 
measures could be used as a predictor of factors such as psychopathology, violence 
and criminal recidivism, and treatment outcomes, in a group that have all received 
the same diagnosis of ASPD, then this provides a challenge to the view that ASPD 
is a homogenous group.   
A statistical clustering technique revealed four subtypes within the group of 
ASPD men. Two of these mapped onto Cleckley’s primary and secondary 
psychopathic subtypes (described in the introduction section, outlined in table 2). A 
third non-psychopathic ASPD group was revealed. A fourth, unexpected group was 
also revealed, which will be referred to as fearful psychopaths. Planned 
comparisons were carried out concerning the primary and secondary clusters.
  This first subgroup of “primary psychopaths” seemed to map onto the classic 
primary psychopath first described by Cleckley. Primary psychopaths have been 
found to have a temperament very low in anxiety (Lykken, 1995).  The current study 
provided support for this, finding significantly lower levels of internalising 
psychopathology relative to the other clusters, along with significantly lower levels of 
violence, aggression and impulsivity in comparison to the secondary group. 
Cleckley’s classic primary psychopath is described as failing to learn from prior 
experience. As predicted, this cluster made significantly more errors on the passive 
avoidance learning task compared to the secondary group.      
  A second cluster seemed to map onto the “secondary psychopath”. This 
group were more likely to be cited for infractions, displayed higher levels of 
internalising and externalising psychopathology.  The secondary psychopaths were 
high in anxiety and depression, and engaged more in externalizing behaviours of 
violence and aggression, in comparison to the cold, callous and unemotional 
primary cluster.  The data did not support predicted differences between primary 24 
 
and secondary clusters in terms of interpersonal dominance. This prediction was 
based on literature that suggests primary and secondary psychopaths differ in terms 
of style, with the latter being more submissive and withdrawn, and the former being 
more dominant and extrovert (Blackburn, 1987). The failure to find the predicted 
difference in dominance could represent a type II error, however, given the sample 
size, and the established psychometric properties of the PAI, which is a well 
validated tool in correctional settings, it seems unlikely. The failure to find the 
predicted difference in dominance is also unlikely to be due to response bias, as the 
PAI includes subscales which identify biased responding.  This study also failed to 
confirm the hypothesis, based on previous meta analyses, that secondary clusters 
would have higher rates of offending in the year post release. Of course recidivism 
can only be assessed based on those crimes which are recorded. Police records 
may well not be an accurate reflection of crimes being committed. The analysis 
accounted for the potential impact of treatment effectiveness on recidivism, 
however, “treatment effectiveness” was measured using counsellor ratings. A 
difficulty with this method of assessing effectiveness is subjectivity and inter-rater 
reliability. Completion of treatment programmes was also used as an index of 
effectiveness, which assumes completion is indicative of active engagement with an 
intervention. It is possible that offenders could appear compliant with treatment, and 
not engage in disruptive behaviours, which would cause them to be rated as having 
a good treatment outcome. This may not necessarily mean that therapy has been 
“effective” in terms of other indices such as symptom reduction, or reduced 
recidivism. The somewhat subjective and specific measures of effectiveness 
employed could have impacted on the failure to find predicted differences in 
treatment outcome between the two groups.                                                            
  A third cluster was also generated by the analysis, consisting of those that 
met the criteria for ASPD but did not meet the PCL-R criteria for psychopathy. In 
answer to the literature review question, this provides support for ASPD as a 25 
 
heterogeneous group, and ASPD and psychopathy as distinct disorders. Of course, 
as outlined in the introduction section, this could be representative of the differential 
sensitivity of the measures. A much lower level of antisocial behavior can attract an 
ASPD diagnosis, whereas, depending on the cutoff scores employed, higher levels 
of pathology are required before clinical levels of psychopathy are diagnosed.  
  A fourth cluster emerged that consisted of those with a highly anxious 
temperament which the authors hypothesised might map onto a “disadvantaged 
sociopath” (Mealey, 1995), which described individuals with antisocial features, 
lower intelligence and socioeconomic disadvantage. This provides further support 
for “ASPD” as a diagnostic term that describes multiple pathways to antisocial 
behaviour. Further validation of this subtype is required.       
  As mentioned, a methodological strength of this study is the unusually large 
sample of ASPD offenders. It would have been interesting to include in the analysis 
offenders who do not meet the criteria for ASPD, to see if they emerged as a fifth 
cluster. If they did not, this would have implications for the utility and specificity of 
the diagnosis of ASPD.             
  The study by Cox et al. (2013) aimed to replicate the findings of Poythress et 
al. (2010) but using a self-report psychopathy measure, the Psychopathic 
Personality Inventory (PPI). As outlined at the beginning of the results section 
above, there is evidence supporting the reliability of the use of self report measures 
of psychopathy in both community (Levenson, Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995) and 
incarcerated populations (Lynam, Whiteside & Jones, 1999). According to the study 
by Cox et al. (2013) six of the eight subscales of the PPI had good discriminant 
validity, although overall the accuracy in terms of correctly identifying cluster 
membership was 43%. An interesting finding was that the PPI was most accurate in 
terms of identifying membership to the non-psychopathic ASPD group. If, as these 
two studies suggest, “ASPD” consists of different clusters which predict factors such 
as violence impulsivity and infractions in institutions, then the Cox et al. (2013) study 26 
 
has promising implications in terms of using a quick and non-resource intensive tool 
in order to further inform risk assessment and formulation. The self-report data 
replicated the differences between primary and secondary psychopaths in terms of 
internalising and externalising psychopathology and impulsivity, although 
unexpectedly, the opposite was found in terms of externalising problems, with 
secondary psychopaths rating significantly lower than the primary group on these 
measures. Unlike in the original study, Cox et al. (2013) found that primary 
psychopaths were more likely to display higher levels of recidivism. The authors do 
not fully explain this anomaly, although do highlight the potential pitfalls of reification, 
and that a dimensional approach to these personality constructs is a valid alternative 
to somewhat “fuzzy” groups or clusters.                      
  The third study reviewed (Coid & Ullrich, 2010), used an alternative 
methodology to investigate whether ASPD and psychopathy are distinct syndromes.  
The SCID-II and PCL-R was administered to 496 prisoners. The SCID-II ASPD 
criteria were broken down into their two constituent parts, childhood conduct 
disorder (CD), and adult antisocial syndrome (AAS). Psychopathy was divided into 
four facets; interpersonal, affective, impulsive and antisocial. A logistical regression 
was then carried out, including these six factors. Demographics, violent offending, 
prior treatment and comorbid psychopathology were also included in the analysis. 
The authors hypothesised that if psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder are 
distinct then there should be differences in the correlations between the different 
facets of psychopathy and the diagnostic criteria for ASPD. They also hypothesized 
that those participants meeting the criteria for both ASPD and psychopathy should 
differ in terms of the antisocial criteria they met from those who are ASPD but not 
psychopathic.                 
  The authors concluded that rather than ASPD and psychopathy representing 
distinct groups, psychopathy may represent an extreme end of an antisocial trait 
dimension. They concluded that there were no significant differences between 27 
 
ASPD with and without psychopathy in terms of their relationship to treatment. Close 
inspection of the results section shows that there were group differences which 
approached significance. There was a lack of power due to increasing the cut off 
point for psychopathy from 25 to 30, despite the empirically recommended cut-off 
point of 25 for UK samples (Cooke & Michie, 1999). After this change in cut off 
score, some previously significant group differences became insignificant, such as 
the finding that those with psychopathy and ASPD displayed higher levels of violent 
offending.  A potential danger of increasing the cutoff point for the PCL-R is that this 
can cause people scoring higher on the psychopathy scale to fail to meet criteria 
and therefore be included into the ASPD only group.       
  Further evidence for the existence of subtypes within ASPD samples is 
provided by Kosson et al. (2006), reviewed in the following section. This study 
measured amount and type of offending, or “criminal versatility”. After the removal of 
those rated as psychopaths, ASPD was a significant predictor of number of violent 
and non-violent offenses. This finding demonstrates that ASPD as a diagnosis has 
predictive utility, which contradicts the argument that any predictive utility in ASPD 
groups is due to the high number of psychopaths which fall into the diagnostic 
category of ASPD.                
  Overall the papers reviewed in this section suggest that “ASPD” may 
represent a heterogeneous group.  At least two of these groups map onto theoretical 
subtypes first identified in the 1940s, the primary and secondary psychopaths. The 
studies suggest that these categories have predictive utility in terms of violence and 
aggression, mood disorders, impulsivity and engagement in treatment. They also 
provide promise for the development of self report tools that can be used with some 
accuracy to inform researchers and clinicians about group membership. These 
studies also raise the question of the utility of a categorical view of antisocial 
behaviour, and highlight the issue of the potential pitfalls of reification. A potential 28 
 
move towards viewing personality pathology in a dimensional manner was 
suggested by Coid & Ullrich (2010). 
4.2 Emotional Processing 
Deficits in emotional processing in psychopaths, children with psychopathic 
traits and antisocial individuals are fairly well established in the literature and are 
implicated in influential models of psychopathy (Blair & Coles, 2000; Marsh & Blair, 
2008). Studies reviewed in this section compare emotional processing in individuals 
with ASPD to those classified as psychopathic (see table 4). 
4.2.1 Affective facilitation  
Research in non-clinical samples has repeatedly found that when people are 
presented with words and non-words, and are then asked to identify what 
constitutes a real word, affective words are better recognized than neutral words. 
This phenomenon has been termed “affective facilitation”. In the study by Kosson et 
al. (2006) it was found that ASPD only offenders did not differ from non ASPD 
offenders in terms of affective facilitation, whereas the ASPD plus psychopathy 
group displayed significantly lower levels of affective facilitation than the ASPD only 
group.  The authors report initially a sample size of 472 inmates. After assessing for 
ASPD and psychopathy, and removing outliers, each of the three groups only 
contained between 25 and 36 offenders with complete emotional processing data. If 
previous estimates of the prevalence of ASPD in incarcerated samples are accepted 
(e.g. 35%, Black, Gunter, Loveless & Sieleni, 2010), then it would be expected that 
a much larger group of ASPD participants would be found in a sample of this size. 
This may be indicative of a lack of sensitivity in the ASPD measure used. The 
authors chose to create interview questions based on the DSM-IV criteria for ASPD 
rather than using a standardised measure such as the SCID-II. Whilst inter-rater 
reliability for the interviews was good (k=.92), the validity of the measure has not 
been empirically validated.  29 
 
Table 4 
Studies Comparing Emotional Processing in Psychopathic and Non-psychopathic ASPD 
 
Study  Population   Sample size  ASPD / Psychopathy 
measures 
Other factors measured  Key findings 
Kosson, 
Lorenz & 
Newman 
(2006) 
Incarcerated 
Caucasian American 
offenders  
472  DSM-IV criteria for 
ASPD 
 
PCL-R 
Criminal history 
 
Affective facilitation 
ASPD is distinct from ASPD with 
psychopathy in terms of emotional 
processing. 
Dolan & 
Fullam 
(2004) 
-UK prison and high 
security hospital who 
met DSM IV criteria 
for ASPD -Staff used 
as control group 
109  DSM-IV criteria for 
ASPD 
 
PCL-SV 
Empathy 
 
First and second order 
ToM tasks 
 
Complex “faux pas” task 
 
Facial emotional 
expression task 
ToM for ASPD and psychopathy 
relatively intact. 
 
ASPD slightly more of a mentalizing 
deficit than psychopathic ASPDs 
Verona, 
Sprague,  
Verona, 
Sprague & 
Sadeh 
(2012) 
American offenders 
recruited via criminal 
justice system 
45   DSM-IV criteria for 
ASPD 
 
PCL-SV 
Negative emotional 
processing and inhibitory 
control 
Blunted negative emotion processing 
in psychopaths regardless of task 
demands. 
Enhanced processing of negative 
emotion in ASPD group despite 
competing demands of task, 
suggesting poor inhibitory control 
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Results demonstrated greater criminal activity and versatility in the 
psychopathic group, suggesting that psychopathy may be a predictor for greater 
number and variety of offences. T-tests revealed significant group differences, with 
psychopaths displaying less affective facilitation than ASPD offenders. ASPD 
offenders performed similarly to controls. It is fair for the authors to conclude that 
there may be differences between ASPD and psychopathy is terms of emotional 
processing. 
Attempts to link performance in the affective facilitation paradigm to real 
world criminal behaviour were less convincing. There were a few significant 
interactions, for example, reduced affective facilitation was associated with more 
nonviolent offences in the psychopathic group, but not the ASPD group. The authors 
do not offer an explanation for this finding, so it remains unclear how performance in 
this paradigm would relate to non-violent offences. The VIM and IES models (Blair, 
1995, Blair et al., 2005) provide accounts of emotion processing in violent 
behaviours. The role of emotional processing in non-violent offending is less clear.  
 
 4.2.2 Theory of mind and mentalizing 
Broadly speaking, empathy is an emotional response to the emotional states 
of others, which some argue requires the ability to first form a mental representation 
of the emotional state in another person. This ability has been referred to as theory 
of mind, or the ability to “mentalize” the internal state of others. Blair (1995) 
developed the idea of the “violence inhibition mechanism”, by which we learn to 
inhibit responses which cause distress to others, and that this mechanism is key in 
the development of the moral emotions such as empathy. He proposed a disruption 
to the development of this neural network in psychopaths, thus a failure to develop 
empathy. The moral/conventional distinction is a paradigm which requires 
participants to make judgements about transgressions which are moral (e.g. 
someone injuring another person) or conventional (violation of social norms, such as 31 
 
a male dressing as a female). Research has found a distinction between the 
judgments made on moral and conventional transgressions, with both adults and 
children usually judging the former to be more serious (Smetana & Braeges, 1990). 
Psychopaths (defined by Hare’s criteria) have failed to make this distinction (Blair, 
1995), but when compared to non-psychopathic offenders do not display deficits on 
simple theory of mind tasks (Blair et al., 1996). Researchers have also failed to find 
a psychopathic deficit on a more complex theory of mind task (Richell et al., 2003). 
The second study (Dolan & Fullam, 2004) reviewed in this section selected a 
sample of ASPD males from a secure hospital and a prison and divided them into 
with and without psychopathy groups, and compared them with a healthy control 
group of staff. They administered an empathy measure, the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI; Davis, 1996), theory of mind tasks (Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998) 
of three levels of complexity, and a facial emotional expression task using Baron-
Cohen’s photographs of faces displaying seven basic emotions (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright & Joliffe, 1997).  The control, ASPD and ASPD with psychopathy 
groups did not differ on empathy, and there were no differences in terms of theory of 
mind ability on first and second order tasks. The interesting finding came from a 
complex “faux pas” task. There were no group differences in terms of the ability to 
identify that a faux pas had been committed and identifying who had committed it. 
However, ASPD and ASPD with psychopathy groups were impaired in comparison 
to the control group in terms of assessing the mental state of the listener and 
speaker. The ASPD only group was significantly worse than the staff control group 
and the ASPD with psychopathy group on recognizing basic emotions in faces. In 
terms of recognizing more complex emotional states from photos of facial 
expressions, the ASPD group was significantly poorer than the control group. Other 
group differences did not reach significance. 
In interpreting these results it is necessary to note the difference between 
merely recognizing the emotion in the face of another person, and theory of mind, or 32 
 
mentalizing, which refer to a felt sense of the emotional state of another person, and 
to recognise that others and our own emotional states are separate. The increasing 
complexity of the theory of mind paradigm used in the Dolan & Fullam (2004) study 
help to differentiate between recognition of emotion, and more complex attributions 
of the internal states of another. In this study this paradigm is taken to be a measure 
of “mentalization”. The construct of mentalization is a development of the concept of 
theory of mind, and the terms are used interchangeably in this study.  
This study replicates findings that psychopaths do not have a specific 
mentalizing deficit, in fact on some aspects of the tasks they outperformed the staff 
control group. It provided further support for ASPD and psychopathy as distinct 
mechanisms, with the ASPD group displaying deficits in terms of the recognition of 
basic emotions in the faces of others. It could be the case that this group maps onto 
the secondary psychopathic group described in this review, who have adverse early 
life experiences. Studies show that violent adolescents from an adverse background 
respond to distress in others with aggression, which would explain the finding from 
the current study that the ASPD group had the most difficulty distinguishing between 
distress and sadness. 
The use of correctional staff as a control group in the Dolan & Fullam (2004) 
study may present a methodological issue. The authors noted that interestingly, the 
staff group performed more poorly on an empathy task than would be expected in a 
general healthy population. There may be some impact of working in a forensic 
environment on mentalizing ability. It is also possible that correctional staff may 
more representative of certain populations (e.g. ex-military) rather than being 
representative of the wider population.  
A potential limitation of this study is the possibility of a ceiling effect of a 
relatively simple task, given that all participants were of at least average intellect. 
Intellect could compensate for a difficult in mentalizing, which could mean that the 
failure to find mentalizing deficits in the psychopathy group represents a type II 33 
 
error. Moreover, the theory of mentalizing in personality disorder posits that people 
may switch in and out of mentalizing modes depending on level of emotional arousal 
(Fonagy & Bateman, 2008). Given the low levels of emotional arousal in a laboratory 
setting, it could be the case that tasks can be completed adequately, which does not 
map onto real life experiences of mentalizing in interpersonal situations. 
 
4.2.3 Negative emotional processing and inhibitory control 
The literature has suggested that ASPD and psychopathy may differ in terms 
of behavioural and physiological response to neutral or emotive stimuli, with 
psychopathic groups showing a reduced response to emotive stimuli (Levenston, 
Patrick, Bradley & Lang, 2000). The impulsive aggressive behaviour exhibited by 
antisocial individuals may be associated with negative emotional reactivity and 
deficits in cognitive control, as demonstrated by performance in studies on inhibitory 
control mechanisms (Morgan & Lilienfield, 2000).  The third study reviewed in this 
section (Verona, Sprague & Sadeh, 2012) was the first to investigate emotion 
processing and inhibitory controls in ASPD only versus ASPD with psychopathy. 
Their hypotheses were based on the theory that in psychopathy, the cognitive 
demands of a task would not affect the emotional processing, whereas those with 
cluster B personality disorders, such as ASPD, are more likely to have their 
inhibitory control affected by emotive situations, given the high level of emotional 
reactivity that is characteristic of this cluster. They hypothesized that this difficulty in 
emotional processing under conditions of inhibitory control would map onto 
everyday difficulties in inhibiting behaviour, as measured by incidents of aggressive 
behaviour. They used a go/no go task in which participants were required to press a 
button in response to words in normal font, and to inhibit this response when the 
word was presented in italicised font. Words were either neutral, generally negative, 
or offender related negative words (e.g. “jail” and “scum”). Results suggested that 
control offenders, those that did not qualify for a diagnosis of ASPD or psychopathy, 34 
 
were able to suppress emotional processing in order to prioritise inhibitory control in 
no-go trials. The psychopathic group showed lower levels of emotional processing 
regardless of whether there were inhibitory demands or not. ASPD offenders had 
difficulty in processing negative emotion when under the demands of inhibiting a 
response. The authors interpreted these results as evidence of differences in 
emotional processing between ASPD only and ASPD with psychopathy groups. 
Psychopaths seemed to have lower levels of emotional processing, regardless of 
the cognitive demands placed or not placed on them, whereas ASPD offenders 
seemed to prioritise processing of negative emotional information even when it 
compromises task performance. The control group was able to suppress their 
emotional reactions in order to deal with the demands of the task, something which 
the ASPD group apparently struggled with. The tendency of the ASPD group to 
prioritize negative emotional processing and failure to inhibit this to deal with the 
demands of a situation may explain the increased impulsive aggression and self-
harm seen in this and other cluster B personality disorders. It is important to note 
that whilst psychopaths outperformed ASPDs in terms of the current task, there was 
no group difference in terms of level of aggressive behaviour. It may be that the 
aetiology of these behaviours differs between the groups. Characteristics of 
psychopathy such as callous unemotional traits and low emotionality lead to poorer 
functional adaptation in many real world contexts. The link between these traits and 
increased risk of violent recidivism is documented in the literature (Walsh & Kosson, 
2008). As noted by the authors, this was the first study of its kind and replication is 
required. The sample size was small relative to the other papers reviewed, and 
therefore type II errors are a possibility.  
The studies in this section used a range of paradigms to investigate whether 
those assigned to ASPD or psychopathy groups varied in terms of emotional 
processing. Whilst strengths of these studies are the stringent methodologies and 
use of empirically validated paradigms, the validity of these paradigms represents a 35 
 
problem for this area of research. The extent to which conclusions can be drawn 
about real world offending behaviour from, for example, the presentation of 
“emotional” word strings is limited.  
 
 4.3 Executive functioning               
  It has been hypothesized that those with ASPD are more emotionally 
reactive whereas those rating highly on both ASPD and psychopathy measures 
display emotional hypo-reactivity. The papers reviewed so far provide some support 
for this theory.  Neuropsychology offers an explanation for this observation. It is 
theorized that deficits in executive functioning may explain the persistent and 
pervasive antisocial behaviour seen in ASPD individuals from teenage years 
throughout adult life, even despite repeated punishment (Blair, Mitchell & Blair, 
2005; Raine et al., 2005). The studies reviewed in this section (summarized in table 
5) investigated executive functioning in order to ascertain whether these deficits 
differed between those with ASPD only and those with ASPD and psychopathy.  
  Blair’s Integrated Emotions System (IES) model explains that ASPD is 
characterized by more affective, reactive aggression which is related to a broad 
range of executive functioning deficits, whereas psychopathy is associated with 
more instrumental, premeditated aggression, which may be related to more specific 
deficits in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (Blair, 2006). Dolan (2012) 
administered a variety of executive functioning tasks to ASPD individuals and also 
measured psychopathy. The methodology differs slightly from others in the review, 
in that psychopathy was measured dimensionally, by dividing ASPD participants into 
low, medium and high psychopathy according to PCL-R scores, rather than nominal 
assignment to ASPD with or without psychopathy groups.  36 
 
Table 5 
Studies of Executive Functioning Processes in ASPD Populations 
Study  Population   Sample 
size 
ASPD / Psychopathy 
measures 
Other factors measured  Key findings 
Dolan 
(2012) 
Offenders from 
UK prison and 
medium and high 
secure hospitals, 
staff control group 
96  SCID II 
PCL:SV 
Spatial planning 
 
Attentional set shifting 
 
Response inhibition 
ASPD had impairments in planning 
compared to healthy controls. 
 
Those with higher psychopathy scores 
performed similarly to control 
 
Set shifting difficulties in ASPD as a 
whole, no psychopathy specific deficit 
De Brito,  
Viding, 
Kumari &  
Blackwood 
(2013) 
Violent ASPD 
offenders from UK 
community and 
community 
controls 
66  SCID I and II 
PCL-R 
-Digit span backwards 
-Spatial alternation task 
-Response reversal task 
-Cambridge Gamble Task 
-Passive avoidance learning 
No significant differences between 
ASPD only and ASPD with 
psychopathy. Both showed deficit on 
verbal working memory and adaptive 
decision making in comparison to non 
offenders 
Zeier, 
Baskin-
Sommers, 
Newman & 
Racer 
(2012) 
Caucasian males 
from maximum 
security US 
correctional 
institution 
126  PCL-R 
 
Number of ASPD 
symptoms evident from 
interview and file review 
Cognitive control (response 
competition task) 
 
Welsh Anxiety Scale 
ASPD performed less accurately on 
cognitive control tasks. Similar deficits 
also found in psychopathy, contrary to 
predictions. 37 
 
Dolan found that those “ASPD” offenders which rated at the higher end of the 
psychopathy scale actually had significantly longer mean reaction times in an 
inhibition task than the healthy controls. The authors conclude that this provides 
support for Hare’s ‘classic psychopaths’ who engage in more instrumental, planned 
acts as opposed to reactive impulsive aggressive acts. However none of the 
planning tasks revealed any group differences, apart from overall a slight deficit in 
planning in the offending group as a whole compared to healthy controls. Set 
shifting ability also did not appear to co vary with psychopathy.      
  The finding that there were significant group differences when dividing 
psychopathy into low, medium and high suggests that this may be a useful 
methodology, rather than using a cutoff score to assign groups.  This endorses the 
view that psychopathy can be more usefully conceptualized as a dimensional trait as 
opposed to the categorical approach adopted by many of the papers described 
here.                      
  All in all the study seemed to employ a rigorous methodology, and controlled 
for extraneous variables such as axis I mental health diagnoses, intellect, trauma, 
and current substance use. A detailed analysis breaking down the tasks into their 
constituent phases and looking at all aspects of performance was carried out. It 
seems fair that the null hypothesis is accepted, i.e., there is no observed difference 
between those rating on psychopathy measures compared to controls in terms of 
planning and set shifting. This negative finding seems to fit theoretically, with the 
classic view of primary psychopathy, as being less reactive and more calculating. 
Whilst psychopathy may represent a continuum, or consist of various clusters, this 
study would suggest that executive functioning does not play a role in this variability.
  The second study (De Brito et al., 2013) broke down executive functioning 
into cool and hot executive functioning; the former referring to primarily cognitive 
processes such as response inhibition, planning, working memory and attentional 
set shifting. Hot executive functions include those that are concerned with emotion, 38 
 
reward and motivation such as the processes involved in affective decision making 
paradigms. Both groups of offenders in the study showed impairments in 
comparison to healthy controls in terms of decision making and verbal working 
memory. They failed to learn from punishment as indicated by performance in a 
passive avoidance learning task, which is an interesting finding as it goes some way 
to explaining the persistent offending by ASPD offenders despite the negative 
consequences. Repeated offending despite negative punishing consequences is a 
common feature of ASPD. This research finding suggests that such individuals may 
have a deficit in terms of their ability to learn from punishment, at a neurocognitive 
level. Whilst expected deficits on a range of cool and hot executive functioning tasks 
were found when comparing offenders as a whole to non-offenders, no differences 
were found between the two offending groups. There is the possibility of type II error 
given the small sample size (n=66).              
  Another aspect of executive functioning is cognitive control, or the ability to 
persevere in goal oriented action despite the presence of competing cognitive and 
behavioural demands. There is generally a relationship between cognitive control 
and ASPD, but studies have failed to find this effect in psychopaths, and in some 
cases they have outperformed healthy controls on tasks of cognitive control (Hiatt et 
al., 2004), specifically primary psychopaths. The Zeier et al. (2012) study used a 
response competition paradigm in order to explore cognitive control across different 
subtypes of antisocial offenders. An interesting finding was that dimensionally 
speaking, ASPD symptoms are negatively associated with cognitive control.  
Despite using the higher cut-off score of 30 to allocate to the psychopathic group, 
this group was relatively large (n=54) in comparison to other studies employing a 
similar design. Despite this larger sample size, they failed to replicate the finding 
that psychopaths have equal or superior cognitive control compared to other 
offenders. This could represent a true negative finding, or it could be attributable to a 
methodological flaw. For example, unlike other similar studies reported here, the 39 
 
authors sub divided the psychopathic offenders by anxiety score. It may have been 
preferable to employ a simple four group design (ASPD with psychopathy, ASPD 
without psychopathy, non ASPD offenders, and healthy controls) and use anxiety as 
a covariate. This study neglected to include a control group, and therefore the 
previous finding that psychopaths outperform controls in terms of cognitive control 
could not be replicated.  Another methodological flaw is that a standardized ASPD 
assessment (such as the SCID-II) was not used. Instead data from the same 
interview and file review used during PCL-R administration was used. Since ASPD 
was deduced from PCL-R data, the overlap in measures could contribute towards 
the overlap in cognitive control deficits between ASPD and psychopathic groups, 
whereas previous studies have found that the latter perform better in terms of 
cognitive control. It would be informative to see how each group performed in 
comparison to controls.             
  Executive functioning is a broad umbrella term encompassing a number of 
constructs, including planning, organization, selective attention, inhibitory controls 
and problem solving. As such, there is no pure, unambiguous test for executive 
dysfunction (Morgan & Lilienfield, 2000), which presents a challenge in this area of 
research. The extent to which the findings from the studies presented here can be 
applied to real world offending behaviour is limited. The applicability of findings from 
simple computerized tasks has limited utility in terms of explaining real world 
behaviour.                    
  Whilst, perhaps due to methodological flaws, some group differences were 
not supported, these studies provide some interesting findings in relation to the 
question posed by this literature review. For example, the findings of the study by 
Zeier et al. (2012) support the view of ASPD as a continuous variable rather than a 
distinct category, with symptom severity correlating significantly with cognitive 
control deficit.  The failure to replicate group differences could be attributable in part 
to the fact that a gold standard diagnostic measure such as the SCID-II was not 40 
 
used. On the other hand this result could represent a true negative finding, 
supporting Coid & Ullrich’s (2010) view of ASPD and psychopathy as being on a 
continuum. 
4.4 Neurological Factors 
The literature searched produced three studies which compared ASPD and 
psychopathy in terms of neurological measures such as startle response, and 
structural brain differences (see table 6). These studies explored the neurological 
processes and structures which may add to the understanding of the emotional 
processing and executive functioning differences discussed in the previous sections.
  The startle reflex is an automatic cortical event, generally accepted to be 
linked to the amygdala (Angrilli et al., 1996; Davis, 1992). It is triggered in response 
to a perceived threat, which, in laboratory paradigms, is usually generated by 
presenting a sudden loud noise.  The function of the startle response is to interrupt 
whatever cognitive processing may be occurring in order to orient attention towards 
a potential threat. In healthy non-offending populations this startle response, as 
evidenced by blinking, is potentiated under conditions in which aversive or 
threatening stimuli is being viewed. In the Vaidyanathan et al. (2011) study, it was 
found that both offending groups did not exhibit this effect, i.e., their startle response 
was not amplified by viewing of aversive stimuli. Further analysis revealed that this 
effect was mainly driven by factor one psychopathy.        
   In the Drislane et al. (2013) study EEG was used to measure P3, a cortical 
response which initiates the startle reflex described above. The P3 has been found 
to be generated in the presence of an audio startle probe in laboratory paradigms. 
Again, this was measured in ASPD and psychopathic offenders when viewing 
neutral or affective stimuli.41 
 
Table 6 
Studies Investigating Neurological Factors in ASPD With and Without Psychopathy 
Study  Population   Sample 
size 
ASPD / Psychopathy 
measures 
Other factors measured  Key findings 
 
Vaidyanathan 
Hall, Patrick & 
Bernat, 2011 
 
 
Incarcerated 
US adult 
males  
 
108 
 
PCL-R 
Structured interview 
questions based on 
DSM-IV ASPD 
criteria 
 
Startle response as measured by 
blinking in response to a noise probe 
whilst viewing neutral and 
threatening stimuli 
 
Deficits in startle reflex in aversive 
picture viewing associated more with 
psychopathic traits than ASPD 
Drislane,  
Vaidyanathan & 
Patrick, 2013 
Incarcerated 
US adult 
males 
143  PCL-R 
Interview questions 
based on SCID II 
P3 (cortical event potentiated in 
response to sudden unexpected 
noise, measured by EEG) 
Factor 1 psychopathy was related to 
reduced startle response. ASPD 
diagnosis did not affect startle 
response 
Gregory, 
Ffytche, 
Simmons, 
Kumari,  
Howard, 
Hodgins & 
Blackwood, 2012 
UK 
probation 
service 
66  PCL-R 
SCID I and II 
Gray matter volumes as measured 
by MRI 
ASPD+P had reduced gray matter 
volume in some brain regions 
compared to ASPD without 
psychopathy. No difference in key 
temporal areas such as amygdala 
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This study also found smaller P3 amplitudes in psychopaths in response to 
noise probes no matter the content of what they were viewing. Again further 
analyses suggested that this effect was accounted for mostly by factor one features 
of psychopathy. Both of these studies provide support for unique features of 
psychopathy, in that they provide empirical evidence for those rating highly on 
measures of psychopathy as exhibiting less of a response to perceived threat. This 
fits with the “low-anxious” psychopath described in this review.  The EEG paradigms 
provide a direct measure of a neurological reaction, which adds further support to 
the validity of Vaidyanathan’s (2011) study.           
  In the Gregory et al. (2012) study MRI was used to measure grey matter 
volume in brain regions implicated in antisocial behaviour in ASPD men with and 
without psychopathy, recruited via the probation service. Whilst amygdala 
dysfunction has been widely implicated in models of psychopathy, only a few studies 
have found evidence of reduced amygdala volume in this group. This study failed to 
find a significant difference in amygdala volume between the two offending groups. 
However they did find reduced grey matter volume in the anterior rostral medial 
prefrontal cortex (arMPFC) and temporal poles in ASPD offenders with psychopathy 
compared to ASPD only offenders. The arMPFC is thought to be involved in the 
assessment of storage of social information and therefore may play a key role in the 
emotional understanding of other’s acts, which relates to the concept of mentalizing 
described by Fonagy and Bateman (2008). The authors explain that the failure to 
find predicted structural differences in the amygdala volumes of those with and 
without psychopathy could be related to the limitations of the imaging techniques, 
which rely on structural measures and do not give information on, for example, 
cortical thickness. This study is deemed to be a high quality study with a particularly 
stringent methodology.  The authors controlled for the effects of comorbid axis-I 
disorders, and substance use, as these can impact the volume of brain structures. 
They also continually checked for substance use throughout the study, which is 43 
 
important in a community sample where substances can be more freely accessed. 
Trained clinicians were used to make diagnoses, which were agreed upon by a 
secondary rater. File information provided reliable corroborative information, 
however a standardised tool such as the SCID-II was not used to assess for ASPD.  
A strength of the design was that groups were matched in terms of comorbid 
personality disorders and substance use disorders. They employed modern imaging 
techniques and statistical mapping software, to avoid the subjectivity and bias of 
manual tracing methods employed in previous similar studies. This is the first study 
to use these imagine techniques to investigate structural differences in ASPD 
offenders with and without psychopathy. The authors acknowledge that replication is 
necessary.                  
  Studies reviewed in this section employed direct objective measures, such 
as EEG and structural MRI in order to test for group differences in brain function and 
structure in ASPD individuals with and without psychopathy. These were high quality 
studies with stringent methodologies, although they all neglected to use 
standardized, validated measures of ASPD such as the SCID-II. Overall the studies 
provide fairly convincing evidence that there may be features unique to 
psychopathy, such as a reduced startle response, which seems to map on to factor 
one type psychopathy, described in the first section of this review. The structural 
imaging study found modest differences (Gregory, 2012) although the stringent 
methodology suggests that this is a true negative finding. The authors also highlight 
that other measures, such as cortical thickness, may yield different results.  
5. Discussion                
  These studies were carefully selected in order to address a specific question; 
whether ASPD and psychopathy are distinct disorders. In order to answer this 
question, studies from four areas were selected; studies employing statistical 
clustering techniques, studies of emotional processing, executive functioning, and 44 
 
other neurological factors such as brain area volume and startle response. Due to 
the specific nature of the question, only a small number of papers were selected.  
After careful review, including a dual rated quality appraisal (Kmet, Lee & Cook, 
2004), these papers are deemed to be high quality in terms of methodology, which 
gives credibility to the conclusions drawn.            
  A large number of people in the US and the UK offending populations meet 
the criteria for ASPD. Historically, the terms “psychopath” “sociopath” and “ASPD” 
have been used somewhat interchangeably. The current literature review explored 
four areas of research in ASPD samples in order to address the question of whether 
psychopathy and ASPD are distinct disorders.        
  Studies using sophisticated statistical clustering techniques found that 
psychopathy scores created meaningful clusters in samples of ASPD offenders. 
They differed in terms of factors such as impulsivity, aggression, anxiety, 
depression, adjustment to prison life, engagement in and outcome of treatment, and 
recidivism. These clusters seemed to map onto those previously described in the 
psychopathy literature, with at least four separate pathways to antisocial behaviour. 
One group (ASPD or secondary psychopaths) seem to point to aggression as a 
result of poor emotional regulation and the tendency to prioritize negative emotional 
content over adaptive response to situations. In another pathway (classic, primary 
“Hare” psychopaths) callous unemotional traits and a hypo-responsivity to emotion 
may be causal in antisocial behaviour and or aggressive behaviour.  
  Studies of emotional processing in groups of ASPD offenders again 
highlighted variation within the group. Those with features of psychopathy were 
distinct from other ASPD offenders in terms of affective facilitation and generally 
displayed blunted negative emotion processing. These studies also suggested that 
ASPD only groups may have poor inhibitory control.  ASPD and psychopathy may 
also represent differences in terms of theory of mind and mentalizing. Some 
negative findings in this area may be due to a ceiling effect of relatively simple tasks, 45 
 
and therefore merits further research and the development of paradigms which 
encompass the concept of “mentalisation”.            
  In terms of executive functioning, the ASPD group as a whole seemed to 
have deficits in planning, set shifting, verbal working memory, response inhibition 
and cognitive control, whereas psychopathic groups were found to perform similarly 
to a non-offending control group of prison staff. This negative finding could be 
interpreted as further evidence for multiple pathways to antisocial pathology, with 
one group being more “reactive” as a result of a failure to inhibit emotional 
responses and aggression, and another group, being more “cold and callous”. 
These groups theoretically map onto the “primary” and “secondary” psychopaths 
described in the introduction section.          
  The final section reviewed studies of neurological factors, such as startle 
response as measured by EEG, and volume of brain structure as measured by MRI 
and statistical mapping software. Again unique differences were identified in the 
psychopathic group, in terms of a reduced startle response, and some reduced gray 
matter volume. Expected structural differences in the amygdala were not observed, 
potentially due to the limitations of the imaging techniques. Further research using 
more advanced and specific measures of brain structures such as cortical thickness 
is required. Studies have suggested that cortical thickness may be a more reliable 
and valid research tool in comparison to gray matter volume (Winkler et al., 2010).
  Overall the studies suggest that psychopathy and ASPD have distinctive 
features, and that the large number of people that meet criteria for ASPD represent 
a homogenous group. Different clusters emerged, suggesting numerous aetiologies 
for antisocial behaviour. This has potential implications in terms of clinical practice, 
research and policy.                 
  In order to address the question of this review a rigorous search was 
conducted, yielding only a small number of suitable studies. In order to explore 
whether ASPD and psychopathy are distinct, it is necessary for researchers to 46 
 
administer measures of both factors. Researchers have only begun to distinguish 
between the two relatively recently, and many papers could not be included in the 
review due to their failure to account for the potential influence of two separate 
constructs. It is necessary for future research to take into account the possibility that 
“ASPD” is a term that may encompass a heterogeneous group, and to make use of 
gold standard measures of both psychopathy and ASPD. This can be achieved with 
minimal resources with the use of a self-report psychopathy measure such as the 
PPI (Lilienfield & Andrews, 1996). Researchers need to simultaneously bear in mind 
the potential pitfalls of reification. It may be more useful in both research and clinical 
practice to conceptualize psychopathy as a continuum rather than as a diagnostic 
category (Coid & Ullrich, 2010). Using psychopathy score as a continuous variable 
would counteract the methodological issue presented by different cutoff points.  
  The papers reviewed suggest that the ASPD diagnosis encompasses a large 
group of people who vary on clinically relevant factors, such as internalising and 
externalizing psychopathology and risk of violent recidivism. Differential diagnosis 
could be used to inform risk assessments, for example, predicting the likelihood of 
aggressive and violent behaviour in prison. One study reviewed suggests that a 
simple, non-resource intensive self-report tool can be used to differentiate these 
subgroups. Psychopathy remains a controversial issue, and is commonly 
misunderstood to be associated with “untreatability” (Skeem, Monahan & Mulvey, 
2002).                   
  The findings of this review suggest that ASPD and psychopathy represent 
distinct constructs, or perhaps, different ends of a continuum. Either way, it is 
arguable that there is variability within the group of “antisocial” offenders as a whole. 
These findings provide support for a move away from considering a belonging to a 
diagnostic category as a risk factor, and a move towards a formulation based 
approach to risk assessment and treatment planning.     
  The conclusions drawn from this review are limited to North American and 47 
 
UK male offending populations. The majority of the studies took their samples from 
incarcerated male populations, so care should be made when generalizing to 
community samples, due to potential effects of incarceration. Some, but not all 
studies controlled for ethnicity, or included only Caucasian males, in order to control 
for potential cross cultural variability in the construct of psychopathy. A meta-
analysis has suggested that this may not be necessary, finding no significant 
difference between black and white males in terms of core psychopathic traits in 
prison, community and psychiatric samples (Skeem, Edens, Camp & Colwell, 2004). 
Studies have found that across the UK and North America, psychopathy is fairly 
consistent, although PCL-R measures vary, with UK samples obtaining a lower 
score for the same level of psychopathy (Cooke & Michie, 1999). This highlights the 
importance of researchers adjusting the cut off scores of measures used. In terms of 
gender, this review is solely focusing on males, given the differential effects of 
gender in terms of biological, social and psychological factors.  The constructs 
discussed here are beginning to be researched in female subjects, (Anton et al. 
2012; Sturek, Loper & Warren, 2008; Warren & South, 2006). 
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Abstract 
Aims 
To investigate psychopathy and mentalization in a large sample of people 
with and without a diagnosis of Borderline (BPD) or Antisocial personality disorder 
(ASPD).  
 
Method 
60 participants from personality disorder (PD) services, 21 from probation 
and 81 non-clinical controls completed a battery of tests of mentalizing, 
psychopathy, and personality pathology, as part of an existing large ongoing 
research project. 
 
Results 
Both PD groups had lower mentalizing scores than controls. BPD pathology 
was predictive of mentalizing ability for two of three mentalizing scales. ASPD 
pathology was a modest predictor of one mentalizing scale.  Both PD groups 
exhibited higher levels of psychopathy in comparison to controls but did not differ 
significantly from each other. The secondary factor of psychopathy was the 
strongest predictor of mentalizing across the sample.   
 
Conclusion 
The mentalizing deficit hypothesis of BPD was supported, a similar deficit 
may also be present in ASPD but replication with a larger ASPD sample is required. 
Overall the data provide some support for a move towards a dimensional model of 
personality disorders. The secondary factor of psychopathy was predictive of 
personality pathology in ASPD and BPD. Findings support ASPD as a 
heterogeneous group, and supports ASPD and psychopathy as distinct constructs. 
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1. Introduction 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is characterized by affective, behavioural, 
cognitive and interpersonal difficulties (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). A 
pervasive pattern of affective instability and difficulty in regulating emotions is 
characteristic in BPD (Lieb et al., 2004), often leading to impulsive, suicidal and 
parasuicidal behaviours, such as self-mutilation.  BPD is increasingly gaining 
recognition as a major public health problem with prevalence estimates at around 
5.9% in the community (Grant, et al., 2008) and 24% in primary healthcare attenders 
in the UK (Moran, Jenkins, Tylee, Blizard & Mann, 2000). BPD is over-represented 
in incarcerated females in England and Wales at about 20% (Nee & Farman, 2005)
   In the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (ASPD) criteria includes impairments in self functioning (e.g. 
ego centrism, failure to conform with lawful or culturally normative behavior), lack of 
empathy or intimacy, antagonism (manipulativeness, deceitfulness, callousness and 
hostility) and disinhibition (impulsivity, irresponsibility and risk taking).  ASPD is 
relatively common in criminal populations with an estimated prevalence of 47% of 
males and 21% of females meeting criteria (Fazel & Danesh, 2002).  
Psychopathy is a construct characterised by reduced guilt, empathy, and 
attachment to others, and a prevalence of antisocial behaviours (Blair, 2007). 
Psychopaths have been described as “human predators who coldly, callously, and 
ruthlessly use charm, deceit, manipulation, threats, intimidation, and violence to 
dominate and control others and to satisfy their own selfish needs and desires” 
(Hare, 2000, cited in Shipley & Arrigo, 2001, p.409). In terms of UK prevalence, it 
has been estimated that 7.7% of male prisoners, and 27% of homicide offenders are 
likely to meet criteria for psychopathy (Coid et al., 2009). Aside from those identified 
in forensic populations, it is likely that there is a prevalence of ‘successful 
psychopaths’ in society. These people may display psychopathic trait patterns but 
have not come into contact with the Criminal Justice System (Lynam, Whiteside & 61 
 
Jones, 1999). Studies have identified many psychopaths working successfully in 
organisations, perhaps using skills of manipulation and influence to great success 
(Board & Fritzon, 2005). It has been estimated that approximately 0.6% of the UK 
general population may meet criteria for psychopathy (Coid et al., 2009).  
Although prevalence is relatively low, it is arguable that psychopaths present 
a great challenge in terms of the criminal justice system, and indeed for the wider 
society. Psychopathy may represent a unique behavioural profile in comparison to 
other individuals who engage in antisocial behaviour. Psychopaths in general 
present greater risk of violent behaviour (Cooke, Michie, Hart & Clark, 2005). In 
terms of offending populations, high scores on measures of psychopathy are 
indicative of future risk of violent recidivism (Hare, 1991 cited in Blair, 2003). 
Psychopathy has also been found to be predictive of treatment failure, violent and 
non-violent offending, and substance misuse (Kosson et al., 2006). Significant 
resources in the UK have been allocated to attempts to find suitable treatment 
pathways for individuals scoring highly on psychopathy, for example, the 
development of the Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder programme 
(DSPD, Department of Health, 1999).  
Historically both treatment and research have viewed personality disorder 
and psychopathy in terms of a categorical diagnosis, indicated by cut off scores on 
gold standard measures such as the SCID-II (Structured Clinical Interview for Axis-II 
Personality Disorders; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams & Benjamin, 1997) and the 
PCL-R (Psychopathy Checklist-Revised; Hare, 2003). There is increasing debate in 
the literature as to whether psychopathy and personality disorders may be more 
usefully viewed as dimensional constructs (Wright, 2009). The current categorical 
classification systems (DSM-5 and ICD-10) have been criticised for poor validity and 
reliability, high comorbidity, poor convergent and discriminant validity, and arbitrary 
cut offs (Verheaul, 2006; Sarker & Duggan, 2010). It is argued that the diagnostic 
criteria employed to date have been based on clinical consensus rather than 62 
 
empirical data (Livesley, 2007). Prior to the most recent revision of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, (DSM-5, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), the possibility of a move towards a dimensional classification of 
personality disorders was explored (Widiger & Simonsen, 2005), and it seemed 
likely that a major shift in the way that Axis II disorders are conceptualised would be 
included. However the decision was made to retain the categorical structure from 
DSM-IV. Nonetheless a new hybrid categorical-dimensional section was added, in 
order to encourage further research in to dimensional approaches to the 
identification of personality disorder (APA, 2013).         
  Common processes have been identified in BPD and ASPD, including 
impulsivity, affective instability, and cognitive symptoms (Paris, 1997). Psychopathy 
may also represent a trait dimension which is related to both ASPD and BPD 
pathology. Elevated psychopathic traits have been found in people with a diagnosis 
of BPD and those with a diagnosis of ASPD (Blackburn & Coid, 1998). High 
psychopathy scores were found to predict borderline personality pathology in a large 
sample of community and incarcerated females (Sprague, Javdani, Sadeh, Newman 
& Verona, 2012). The authors posited that BPD may be a “female phenotypic 
expression of psychopathy”.  Historically the term “psychopathy” has been used 
interchangeably with “ASPD”. There is ongoing debate as to whether or not 
psychopathy and ASPD represent distinct disorders (e.g. Ulrich & Coid, 2010). 
  Another construct of interest in the study of BPD and ASPD pathology is that 
of “mentalizing”. Mentalization, like psychopathy, may represent a trait dimension 
associated with personality disorder pathology. The ability to “mentalize” refers to 
the process of perceiving and understanding one’s own and others’ behaviour in 
terms of intentional mental states (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006). Early attachment 
relationships are key to the development of mentalization. In order to create internal 
representations of mental states the infant must experience “mirroring” from the 
primary caregiver. Bateman and Fonagy argue that many psychological disorders 63 
 
can be understood in terms of difficulties with mentalizing. In a non-mentalizing 
mode, cognitions and emotions are experienced as real and concrete. A chronically 
depressed individual, for example, may experience negative self-appraisals as real, 
rather than “just thoughts” leading to low self-esteem.  There is empirical evidence 
to support the premise that mentalisation is disrupted in those diagnosed with ASPD 
and BPD (McGauley, Yakeley, Williams & Bateman, 2011; Fonagy & Bateman, 
2008) and in those categorised as “psychopaths” (Dolan & Fullam, 2004).  
Mentalization is a construct which has provided a promising focus for intervention for 
personality disorders which clinicians have historically viewed as difficult to treat 
(Fonagy & Bateman, 2006).               
  A recent doctoral research project investigated the hypothesis that the 
degree of ASPD symptomatology would predict the extent of mentalizing difficulties 
(Newbury-Helps 2011). In this study 82 male offenders on license in the community 
ASPD completed three computerised measures of mentalizing ability; the Movie 
Assessment for Social Cognition (MASC, Dziobeck, Fleck, Kalbe, Rogers, 
Hassenstab, Brand & Convit, 2006), The Perspective Taking Test (Dumontheil et al., 
2010) and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes, Revised Version (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001).  ASPD traits were measured using the 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI, Morey, 1991).  Data from the London 
Probation Service’s offender management database was also used to provide a 
behavioural measure of the severity of ASPD pathology. The results revealed that 
those offenders with a diagnosis of ASPD seemed to have a mentalizing deficit in 
comparison to those without a diagnosis of ASPD. In terms of the hypothesised 
relationship between ASPD traits and mentalizing deficit, some modest correlations 
were revealed. Three of the mentalizing subscales had some predictive power in 
terms of ASPD severity.              
  The current study will extend the research of Newbury-Helps (2011) with a 
larger and more diverse sample, including people meeting criteria for BPD, ASPD 64 
 
and non-clinical controls. Data on mentalizing could provide empirical support for the 
mentalization deficit theory of personality disorder (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). This 
study will employ a mixture of computerized and self report measures of 
mentalizing. This may be beneficial in that scores are less likely to be affected by 
intellectual ability in comparison the complex computerised tasks employed in 
previous studies.                 
  In accordance with the mentalizing deficit hypothesis of personality disorder, 
it was predicted that the ASPD and BPD groups would demonstrate a mentalizing 
deficit in comparison to the control group in terms of their scores on the three 
mentalizing measures.                
  In line with a dimensional model of personality disorder, it was hypothesised 
that personality pathology would vary with psychopathy when measured as 
dimensional constructs. Specifically, it was predicted that as personality disorder 
pathology increases, psychopathy scores would increase and mentalizing scores 
would decrease. Analysis of this data will also allow for testing of the premise that 
BPD is a “phenotypic expression of psychopathy” (Sprague et al., 2012), if elevated 
psychopathy traits were found in the BPD group. By comparing the three groups on 
psychopathy measures, this will also contribute to the ongoing debate as to whether 
ASPD and psychopathy are distinct disorders. If they are similar constructs then it 
would be expected that the ASPD group would have a significantly higher score on 
psychopathy measures compared to the BPD and control groups.     
            One study has previously explored the 
relationship between mentalizing and psychopathy (Dolan &Fullam, 2004), who 
found that psychopathy was associated with a deficit on subtle tests of mentalizing 
ability. A third, somewhat exploratory hypothesis was that psychopathy score would 
be related to mentalizing ability. Due to previous support in the literature for different 
subtypes of psychopathy (Poythress et al., 2010; Cox et al., 2013), it was predicted 
that primary and secondary subscales of a self report psychopathy measure may 65 
 
differ in terms of their relationship to mentalizing ability. A finding that these 
subscales differ in terms of mentalizing ability and personality disorder pathology 
would provide further support for the two factor theory of psychopathy.    
1.  Method                  
  This study drew its sample from a large ongoing study which is investigating 
the neural and behavioural signatures of emerging and manifest BPD and APSD in 
adult and adolescent clinical and control populations (Montague and Fonagy, 
Wellcome grant). This involved completing a range of structured interviews, 
questionnaires, and behavioural measures, and engaging in computer tasks in an 
fMRI paradigm. The larger study recruited participants from outpatient personality 
disorder services across London, London Probation Services and MST (multi 
systemic therapy) trial sites. Ethical approval for the study was granted by the 
Research Ethics Committee (REC) for Wales (See Appendix B1). 
2.1 Participants 
A power analysis was conducted and assuming a power of 0.8 and an alpha 
of <.05, a minimum sample size of 59 participants was required. 
From the larger study database, cases which had complete datasets as of March 
2014 were selected for analysis, for a total of 162 participants. Anyone with a 
diagnosis of ASPD according to the SCID-II was allocated to the ASPD group 
(N=21). The remaining cases were divided into those meeting criteria for BPD 
(N=60), and controls who did not meet criteria for either diagnosis (N=81). 
2.2 Demographics 
Socio demographic data was gathered on gender, ethnicity, education, 
parental income and education, physical health, and history of psychological therapy 
and details of medications prescribed. These are potential covariates which could be 
controlled for in analysis. For example, IQ may affect scores on measures of 66 
 
mentalizing ability, as was found to be the case in previous research (Newbury-
Helps, 2011). 
Table 1 displays the demographic characteristics of the sample. The 
intention of the study was to match groups in terms of age, gender, ethnicity and 
intellectual ability. Gender was not evenly distributed across samples. 
 
Table 1 
 Demographic Characteristics of Sample  
   Control  BPD  ASPD 
N  81  60  21 
 
Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
Age  29.01 (10.52)  31.34 (10.03)  31.86 (13.59) 
IQ 
      50.75 (5.73)  46.97(8.44)  45.95 (6.72) 
Intellectually impaired  3.70%  13.33%  15.00% 
Definitely below average  29.60%  35.00%  30.00% 
Average  54.30%  45.0%  50.00% 
Definitely above average  4.90%  5.00%  5.00% 
Intellectually superior  7.40%  0.00%  0.00% 
Ethnicity 
   
  
White British  51.90%  56.70%  61.90% 
Other white  14.80%  15.00%  0.00% 
Black British  8.60%  13.30%  9.52% 
Mixed  13.60%  3.30%  9.52% 
Asian British  8.70%  6.70%  9.52% 
Other / not stated  2.40%  5.00%  9.52% 
Gender 
   
  
Males  48.10%  21.67%  100.00% 
Females  51.90%  76.67%  0.00% 
Not specified  0.00%  1.66%  0.00%  
Education 
 
     
No GCSEs  6.20%  12.07%  23.81% 
GCSEs less than 5 A* to C  8.60%  6.90%  23.81% 
GCSEs 5 or more A*-C  23.50%  24.14%  28.57% 
A level  35.80%  29.31%  14.29% 
Higher education  16.00%  25.86%  4.76% 
Postgraduate  9.90%  1.72%  4.76% 
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The gender distribution in the sample generally reflects the disproportionate 
percentage of females referred to personality disorder services, and males in the 
probation service.  A series of t-tests revealed no significant difference between the 
groups in terms of age. A chi squared analysis suggested that there were no 
significantly unusual variations in ethnicity across the samples, 2(30,162)=41.84, 
p=0.07. There was evidence of significant variation in terms of the highest level of 
education reached across the samples, 2(12, 162)=20.86, p=0.05. A Cramer’s V of 
.25 indicated a small effect size. 
2.3 Procedure  
Clinicians at clinical recruitment sites were briefed as to the nature of the 
study and inclusion criteria, and how to explain the study to potential participants. 
They were provided with information sheets for clinicians and for potential 
participants. Volunteers then completed a form granting their consent to be 
contacted by researchers from the larger study. The probation service used their 
computer database which identifies those likely to receive a diagnosis of personality 
disorder in order to focus recruitment to those likely to meet criteria for ASPD. 
Control participants were recruited via an online participant pool, and via posters in 
public places such as coffee shops, and were then screened by telephone for 
eligibility. Attempts were made to match the control participants to the clinical groups 
in terms of age and education. At the first testing session participants were given an 
information sheet (Appendix B2) and signed a consent form (Appendix B3). Upon 
completion of the tasks participants were given a debriefing form (Appendix B4). In 
order to mediate the risk of participant distress after leaving the research site, the 
debriefing form contained relaxation and distress tolerance techniques, and contact 
details of an experienced clinician and the overarching study supervisor.  
Participants were compensated £10 per hour, plus an additional payment calculated 
based on their performance on computerized tasks. 68 
 
If participants declined or were not eligible for the fMRI aspect of the study, 
testing took place at clinical sites from which participants were recruited. Control 
participants and those eligible for fMRI tested at the Functional Imaging Laboratory, 
Queen Square. The overarching study required the completion of a large number of 
measures and an fMRI scan, and therefore two separate testing sessions were 
required. Each session was facilitated by one of a team of researchers from clinical 
and academic psychology disciplines. Where possible, the same researcher 
conducted both sessions. 
2.4 Design 
This study employed a cross sectional between groups design in order to 
explore group differences in mentalizing and psychopathy scores between those 
with and without a diagnosis of personality disorder. A correlational design was also 
employed in order to investigate psychopathy, mentalizing and personality pathology 
as covarying trait dimensions. 
 
2.5 Measures  
a) IQ: The Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven & Court, 2003) are 
an easily administered measure of intelligence as measured by abstract reasoning 
ability. The respondent is provided with a booklet of patterns, each with a missing 
section. The respondent is required to correctly identify the one missing item from 
six that are presented. There are five sets each containing 12 items for a total of 60 
items, which become progressively more difficult. The test is widely used in research 
and has the benefit of being free from the influence of language and literacy skills, 
and easy to administer. Split-half and test-retest reliability are reported to be above 
.80 (Raven, 2000) which is deemed as high. The test correlates with other 
established measures of intelligence (r values between .5 and .7) including the 
Weschler scales (Burke, 1972). The results provide a raw score, which relate to  69 
 
percentiles. The percentiles inform categories, ranging from “intellectually impaired” 
to “intellectually superior”.  The raw score was used in the current study as a 
measure of fluid intelligence, and the distribution of categories is also presented. 
b) Personality Disorder: Personality pathology was measured by the 
administration of the Structured Clinical Interview for Axis-II DSM-IV personality 
disorders (SCID-II: First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams & Benjamin, 1997). The scale 
remains valid for measuring DSM-V personality disorders, as the original DSM-IV 
categorical system was retained in the DSM-V. The SCID-II is a semi-structured 
interview in which respondents are asked about their behaviour, thoughts, emotions 
and relationships, for example, “do you have a lot of sudden mood changes?”. 
Responses are graded on a four point scale, from “?” which denotes insufficient 
information, to “three” indicating that the symptom is endorsed. Researchers were 
trained by a clinician in the administration and scoring of this semi structured 
interview. Previous studies have shown the SCID-II to have excellent inter-rater 
agreement, with kappa values of between 0.77 and 0.94, in terms of both 
categorical diagnosis of personality disorders and when using the tool to measure 
personality pathology dimensionally (Lobbestael, Leurgans & Arntz, 2011). The 
SCID-II was used to provide categorical diagnoses and also dimensional indicators 
of level of personality pathology, as defined by the number of items endorsed 
(indicated by the researcher assigning a score of three to an item). As per the 
protocol of the overarching study, the SCID-II was administered to all participants 
recruited from clinical and probation sites but not to community controls.  
The Standard Assessment of Personality – Abbreviated Scale (SAPAS; Moran, 
Leese, Lee, Walters, Thornicroft & Mann, 2003) was administered to all participants. 
The SAPAS is a brief eight item screening measure. The authors recommend a 
score of four or above as indicative of clinical levels of personality pathology (Moran 
et al., 2003). Five control participants scored four or above and therefore it was 70 
 
decided that they would also complete the SCID-II. None of these five participants 
reached criteria for any of the personality disorders.  
As an additional measure of borderline personality pathology that would 
provide a continuous measure of borderline personality traits, the borderline 
subscale of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI-BOR; Morey, 1991) was 
included in the analysis. The PAI-BOR is a self report questionnaire containing 24 
items relating to the core features of BPD; affective instability, identity and 
relationship problems, and self harm. Respondents are required to rate items such 
as “my moods get quite intense” and “my relationships have been stormy” on a four 
point scale, (0 to 3; false, slightly true, mainly true, very true). This scale has been 
validated in non clinical samples which makes it appropriate for the current study 
(Jackson & Trull, 2001). This scale has been suggest to have good internal 
consistency (α=.84; Trull, 1995), good convergent and discriminant validity, and high 
test-restest reliability over a three to four week period (r=.86, Morey, 1991). 
c) Psychopathy: The Levenson Self Report Psychopathy Scale (SRPS; 
Levenson, Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995) is a 26-item self-report measure designed to 
evaluate both the behavioral and personality traits commonly associated with 
psychopathy.  Items such as, “people who are stupid enough to get ripped off 
usually deserve it “are rated on a five point scale, from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree”. The SRPS consists of two factors, (interpersonal and behavioural) 
which theoretically represent the two factors of the PCL-R. It is deemed to be a 
quick and reliable method of assessing the level of psychopathic traits in non-clinical 
populations, and also correlates well with the PCL-R in forensic populations 
(Brinkley, Schmitt, Smith & Newman, 2001). The SRPS has been found to have high 
test – retest reliability across a two month period, r=.83, p<.01. (Lynam, Whiteside & 
Jones, 1999). In the same study a factor analysis confirmed a two factor model, 

2(280, N = 1852) = 45, p <.001. In terms of internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha 71 
 
values for the total SRPS score, primary, and secondary factors have been reported 
as .85, .83 and .69 respectively (Brinkley, Schmitt, Smith & Newman, 2001).  
d) Antisocial Behaviour: Given that the SCID-II would not be administered to 
control participants, the Life History of Aggression (LHA, Coccaro, Berman & 
Kavoussi, 1997) was administered as a supplementary measure of antisocial and 
aggressive behaviour. The LHA is an 11 item self report questionnaire, consisting of 
three subscales; aggression, antisocial behaviour/consequences, and self directed 
aggression. Respondents are required to indicate the frequency of the occurrence of 
events over the course of their lifetime, such as “got into physical fights with other 
people” and “had difficulties with the law or police which resulted in a warning, arrest 
or conviction for a misdemeanour or felony offense”. Items are rated on a scale from 
zero (never happened) to five (happened so many times I couldn’t give a number). 
Possible scores therefore range from 0 to 55, with a higher total score indicating a 
more aggressive history.  It has been found to have excellent test-retest stability 
(0.91) and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88 was reported indicating good internal 
consistency (Coccaro et al., 1997).   
e) Mentalizing ability: Given the lack of established and validated self report 
measures of mentalization, the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ-54, 
Fonagy & Ghinai, in preparation) was used as a measure of mentalizing deficit. The 
subscales were analysed for internal consistency, and hypothesis testing using 
RFQ-54 scores as a continuous measure of mentalizing deficit may provide support 
for a non resource intensive, easy to administer self report measure of mentalizing. 
The Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ-54; Fonagy & Ghinai, in 
preparation) is a 54 item self-report measure of mentalization. This is an adaptation 
of the Reflective Functioning Scale (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). Items 
such as ‘I always know what I feel’, are rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 = ‘disagree strongly’ to 7 = ‘agree strongly’. This RFQ-54 provides an overall 
mentalizing trait score and two subscale scores: mentalizing with respect to self 72 
 
(Internal-Self) and mentalizing others (Internal-Other). The RFQ has been shown to 
have acceptable internal consistency with a cronbach’s alpha of .85 and .78 for the 
two subscales (Fonagy & Ghinai, unpublished manuscript).  
Given that the RFQ-54 still requires empirical validation, a well validated 
existing measure of mentalizing was also used. The Movie Assessment for Social 
Cognition (MASC; Dziobeck et al., 2006) is a sensitive video-based test for the 
evaluation of subtle mindreading difficulties. Participant are shown a 15 minute film 
in which four characters get together for a dinner party. The video is paused 46 
times for participants to answer multiple choice questions concerning the characters’ 
feelings, thoughts and intentions, such as “What is Sandra feeling?” and “why is 
Michael saying this?”. The MASC has good internal consistency, with a reported 
alpha of 0.84. Intraclass correlation coefficients suggested good test-retest reliability 
(ICC=0.97).  
2.6 Statistical Analysis 
All data from the overall study was continually entered onto an Excel 
spreadsheet. Questionnaire responses were checked and reversed appropriately for 
total scores to be correctly calculated before being exported to SPSS 22 (IBM Corp, 
2013) for analysis. Data was explored for skewness, kurtosis and outliers in order to 
check whether assumptions for parametric testing were satisfied. Initial analysis was 
conducted in order to calculate the Cronbach’s alpha for the scores used, as in 
index of the internal consistency of the scales before proceeding to the hypothesis 
driven testing.                    
  In order to test the hypothesis that ASPD and BPD are characterized by a 
mentalizing deficit, it was first necessary to explore group differences in terms of 
mentalizing measures. It was recommended  (Fonagy, personal communication) 
that the RFQ54 be scored in terms of two subscales; Low Reflective Functioning – 
uncertain (LRFu) and the Low Reflective Functioning – certain (LRFc). The former 73 
 
measuring uncertainty as to mental states of self and others, and the latter, a 
measure of certainty about the mental states of self and others. Three ANOVAs 
were conducted, in order to assess group differences on each of the three 
mentalizing measures (MASC, LRFu and LRFc). Post hoc tests allowed to allow 
group comparisons where a main effect was revealed in order to see which group 
differences were significant. To establish whether any significant group differences 
remained so whilst accounting for the variance that may be related to intellectual 
abilities. Using ANCOVA, Raven’s score was entered as a covariate into the models 
and again, post-hoc tests were used to assess which, if any, group differences 
would remain significant. In order to explore personality pathology as a continuous 
trait, Pearson’s correlations were conducted between each mentalizing measure 
and personality scale (LHA and PAI-BOR), as well as Raven’s score, to assess 
whether intellectual ability was related to scores on any of the mentalizing 
measures. For the subscales that were deemed likely to be affected by IQ, partial 
correlations were conducted with Raven’s score as a bivariate. The outcome of 
these correlations were then used to inform the decision to enter variables into three 
multiple linear regression models, in order to explore the predictive power of 
personality traits and IQ, with the three mentalizing scales as outcomes in three 
separate models. This would inform the hypothesis that PD traits are predicitive of 
mentalizing pathology, accounting for the potential impact of IQ score. Due to the 
lack of prior research utilising the RFQ-54 subscales in this way the decision was 
made to enter all variables at the same time.  
In order to inform the second hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
psychopathy and personality pathology, an ANOVA was conducted to assess for 
differences between the two PD groups and the control group, with total 
psychopathy score as an outcome variable. Significantly higher psychopathy scores 
in the BPD group would support the premise of BPD as a phenotypic expression of 
psychopathy. If ASPD and psychopathy are not distinct disorders then a significantly 74 
 
higher psychopathy score in the ASPD group would be expected. Correlational 
analyses between severity of BPD and ASPD traits were then conducted in order to 
further explore the relationship between psychopathy and personality pathology. If 
the primary and secondary scales correlated differentially with severity of traits this 
would support psychopathy as a multidimensional construct. As in the testing of the 
first hypothesis, the outcomes of these correlational analyses were used to inform a 
regression model, in order to further assess the predictive power of any variables 
which seemed to be significantly correlated. 
In order to test the third exploratory hypothesis around mentalizing ability 
and psychopathy, a series of correlations were conducted between the three 
mentalizing scales and the three self reported psychopathy scales. Finally, a 
multiple linear regression was conducted in order to assess the extent to which 
psychopathy was predictive of mentalizing deficit. 
Throughout the analysis, the Games-Howell post-hoc test was used when 
the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated as indicated by a significant 
Levene’s statistic. When this assumption was not violated, the Tukey’s post-hoc 
procedure was used (recommended in Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner & Barrett, 2012) 
 
3.  Results       
3.1 Reliability of scales      
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for all scales and subscales used in the 
analysis. Values are presented in table 2 and indicate that the majority of the scales 
used had good internal consistency. The subscales with the lowest alpha values 
were the primary and secondary subscales of the SRPS, which seemed to have 
poor internal consistency.   
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Table 2 
  Internal Consistency of  Scales 
Scale  Cronbach's alpha 
RFQ54 
  LRFc  0.86 
LRFu  0.85 
PAI-BOR 
  Affective Instability  0.87 
Identity Problems  0.77 
Negative Relations  0.77 
Self Harm  0.84 
Total  0.94 
SRPS 
  Primary  0.58 
Secondary  0.58 
Total  0.7 
LHA 
  Aggression  0.89 
Antisocial/consequences  0.73 
Self directed aggression  0.88 
LHA total  0.87 
MASC  0.95 
 
The subscales with the lowest alpha values were the primary and secondary 
subscales of the SRPS, which seemed to have poor internal consistency. Alpha 
values for the SRPS are slightly lower than those reported in previous studies alpha 
values of .85, .83 and .69 for total, primary and secondary factor scores respectively 
were reported by Brinkley et al. (2001). 
3.2 Data exploration                
  Data were explored for normality and outliers. Starting with the control group, 
the LHA, PAI-BOR, MASC and LRFu scales were skewed, as indicated by dividing 
the skewness statistic by the standard error.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-
Wilks statistics were also significant for these scales, providing further evidence of 
skewness. In order to address this, Z-scores were calculated and ten cases with a 
value >2 were identified. The decision was made to remove these cases in their 76 
 
entirety. As a result, all scales, with the exception of the LHA, no longer 
demonstrated any evidence of skewness on all indices. Four extreme values in 
terms of LHA score were identified and the cases removed, after which the LHA also 
met assumptions for normality on all indices described above. The remaining N for 
the control group was 67.              
  For the ASPD group, all scales did not violate assumptions of normality 
according to any of these indices, with the exception of the total SRPS score, which 
provided a value >2 when the skewness statistic was divided by the standard error. 
Calculation of Z scores revealed one extreme low value. All data for this entire case 
was removed, after which all assumptions were satisfied. The remaining N for the 
ASPD group was 20.               
  For the BPD group, all scales met all the above assumptions, with the 
exception of LRFu, which had a significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. Two cases 
were identified by SPSS as extreme values (one high, one low). These two cases 
also converted into Z scores >2. As such all data from these two cases were 
removed from the dataset, after which the data satisfied all tests described here and 
were deemed suitable for parametric testing.         
  After removal of these 17 cases the remaining N was 145 with 67 controls, 
58 in the BPD group and 20 in the ASPD group. 
3.3 Matching samples              
  Previous research suggests that measures of mentalizing such as the MASC 
can be affected by IQ. In order to assess whether samples were matched in terms of 
IQ, t-tests were conducted. Table 3 displays groups means for IQ, as indicated by 
the mean raw score on the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven 
& Court, 2003). 
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Table 3 
Mean Raw Raven’s Scores and Categories  
       Control  BPD  ASPD 
N  67  58  20 
Raven’s SPM raw score M (SD)   50.75 (5.73)  46.97(8.44)  45.95 (6.72) 
Intellectually impaired  3.70%  13.33%  15.00% 
Definitely below average  29.60%  35.00%  30.00% 
Average  54.30%  45.0%  50.00% 
Definitely above average  4.90%  5.00%  5.00% 
Intellectually superior  7.40%  0.00%  0.00% 
 
The control group had a significantly higher IQ score as indicated by the Ravens raw 
score in comparison to the BPD group t(126)=3.29, p=.001, and the probation 
group, t(88)=3.07, p=.002. There was no significant difference between the two 
clinical groups in terms of IQ score.  
3.4 Hypothesis testing             
  The first hypothesis was that there would be a mentalizing deficit in the 
personality disorder groups.  A series of one way ANOVAs was conducted in order 
to examine group differences in mentalizing ability (see table 4). 
Table 4 
      Results of One Way Analysis of Variance for Group Differences in Mentalizing 
Measures 
   LRFu  LRFc  MASC 
 
Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
Control  8.55 (5.24)  25.83 (11.80)  35.45 (4.05) 
BPD  25.57 (9.60)  13.19 (7.45)  32.47 (4.97) 
ASPD  20.35 (8.28)  19.59 (13.09  28.15 (4.21) 
F value  76.53  21.60  22.09 
Significance  p<.001  p<.001  p<.001 
Effect Size 
(Eta squared)  .53  .24  .24 
 
The LRFu is a deficit measure, therefore a higher score indicates more of a deficit in 
mentalizing. For the LRFu subscale, a significant group difference was revealed, 
F(2,134)=76.53, p<0.001. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated 78 
 
as indicated by a significant Levene’s statistic , p<0.001, therefore the Games-
Howell post hoc procedure was performed. This indicated that control group had 
significantly less of a deficit in mentalizing compared to the BPD group (p<0.001) 
and the ASPD group (p<0.001). The difference in LRFu score between the two 
personality disorder groups was not significant. Overall an effect size of .53 
indicates that 53% of the variance in LRFu score was accounted for by group 
membership. Using the benchmark for effect sizes recommended by Cohen (1988) 
this is deemed to be a large effect size.           
  For the LRFc subscale the model suggested that there was a significant 
difference between groups, F(2,134)=21.60, p<0.001. Again the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated, indicated by a significant Levene’s result 
(p=0.01). Games-Howell post hoc multiple comparisons suggested that this finding 
was driven primarily by a significant difference between the control and BPD groups 
(p<0.001) with the control group scoring significantly higher than the BPD group in 
terms of their certainty around mental states of self and others. An effect size of .24 
suggests a medium effect size, with 24% of the variance in LRFc  score accounted 
for by group membership.              
  There was a significant group difference in terms of MASC score, 
F(2,142)=22.09, p<0.001. Tukey’s post hoc multiple comparisons suggested that the 
control group scored significantly higher on the MASC compared to the BPD group 
(p=.001) and the ASPD group (p<0.001). The ASPD group scored significantly lower 
than the BPD group (p=.001). These findings provide support for the hypothesis that 
PD is characterised by a mentalizing deficit. A partial ETA squared value of .24 
indicates a medium effect size, with 24% of the variance in MASC score was 
accounted for by group membership.            
   Previous studies indicated that IQ may impact performance on measures of 
mentalizing, analysis of covariance was conducted to control for the impact of IQ 
scores on task performance.  79 
 
Table 5 
      ANCOVA Controlling for Effect of IQ on Group Differences in Mentalizing  
   LRFu  LRFc  MASC 
 
Mean (S.E)  Mean (S.E)  Mean (S.E) 
Control  8.89 (.96)  25.55 (1.34)  34.94 (.54) 
BPD  25.51 (1.05)  13.05 (1.47)  32.78 (.58) 
ASPD  20.92 (1.89)  19.59 (2.64)  28.61 (.99) 
F value  67.76  19.07  15.40 
Significance  p<.001  p<.001  p<0.001 
Effect Size(Eta 
squared)  .51  .23  .18 
 
Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed in order to test whether these 
significant differences remained after controlling for IQ. For LRFu scores the model 
remained significant, F(1,134)=67.76, p<.001. The effect size remained large, at .51. 
All group comparisons described previously remained unaffected. For the LRFc 
subscale scores, the model remained significant, F(1,134)=19.07, p<.001, with a 
similar medium effect size of .23. Again was driven, according to Sidak post hoc 
tests, by a significant difference between the control and BPD groups, p<.001. 
 For the MASC scores, the model remained significant after controlling for IQ, 
F(1,142)=15.40, p<0.001, however the effect size reduced to .18, indicating a 
medium effect size. Post hoc Sidak tests indicated that the difference between 
control and BPD groups remained significant, p=.025, as did the difference between 
the control and ASPD group, p<.001. The significant difference between the two 
personality disorder groups remained unchanged after controlling for IQ.    
  In order to test the hypothesis that mentalizing ability is related to personality 
pathology, correlations were conducted between the three MASC subscales and the 
two personality disorder trait measures. In order to account for the potential impact 
of IQ on performance on tests of mentalizing, IQ score was also correlated with 
each mentalizing scale (see table 5). Any positive correlations would inform the 
decision to carry out regressional analyses. 80 
 
Table 6 
      Correlations Between Mentalizing and Personality Scales 
   PAI-BOR  LHA  IQ 
LRFc  -.53**  -.33**  .14 
LRFu  .66**  .46**  -.28** 
MASC  -.30**  -.32**  .37** 
** Significant at p<.001 
Small to moderate significant correlations were revealed between all mentalizing 
scales and the two personality scales. IQ score also had a small but significant 
correlation with the LRFu and MASC subscales, therefore partial correlations were 
conducted for these variables, to explore the relationship between severity of 
personality pathology and mentalizing deficit, whilst accounting for the potential 
effects of IQ. Since there was no significant relationship between IQ and LRFc, 
partial correlations were not carried out for this subscale.  
Table 7 
    Partial Correlations Controlling for IQ 
   PAI-BOR  LHA 
LRFu  .64**  .43** 
MASC  -.24*  -.29* 
**significant at p<.001    *significant at p<.01 
 
After controlling for IQ Pearsons r values reduced slightly (see table 7) but all 
correlations remained significant. The strong positive correlation between the LRFu 
subscale and PAI-BOR, r=.64, p<.001, supports the hypothesis that severity of BPD 
pathology is related to an increase in mentalizing deficit. A moderate and significant 
correlation between the LHA and the LRFu suggests that an increase in severity of 
antisocial and aggressive traits is also associated with an increase in mentalizing 
deficit. Small but significant negative correlations between the MASC and PAI-BOR, 
r=.24, p<.01 and between the MASC and LHA, r=-.29, p<.001, suggest that a 
decrease in MASC score is associated with increasing severity of personality 
pathology, supporting the mentalizing deficit hypothesis. The LRFc measures the 81 
 
certainty about mental states of others. A significant moderate negative correlation 
between LRFc score and PAI-BOR scores, r=.53, p<.001 suggests that increase in 
severity of BPD is related to a decrease in the certainty of mental states of self and 
others. The same was the case for antisocial traits, although the correlation was 
small rather than moderate, according to Cohen’s criteria (Cohen, 1988).   
  Given these findings, a linear regression was carried out in order to explore 
the extent to which personality pathology was predictive of mentalizing deficit (table 
7). For the MASC and LRFu scales IQ was added to the model. LHA score was a 
significant predictor of MASC score, b= -.24, t(134)=-2.26, p=.03, whereas PAI-BOR 
was not a significant predictor of MASC score. IQ score was also a significant 
predictor of MASC score, b= .32, t(134)=-4.14, p<.001. 
 
Table 8 
    Regression Analyses 
    Dependent variable  Independent variables  R
2 
MASC 
PAI-BOR 
.22  LHA* 
IQ score** 
PAI-BOR 
.12  LHA 
LRFu 
PAI-BOR** 
.45 
LHA 
IQ score 
PAI-BOR 
.44  LHA 
LRFc 
PAI-BOR** 
.28  LHA 
*significant predictor p<.05  ** significant predictor p<.001 
Overall the model (see table 8) accounted for 22% of the variance in MASC score, 
R
2=.22, F(3,137)=12.62, p<.001.  However when IQ was removed from the model, 
only 12% of the variance in MASC score was accounted for R
2=.12, F(2,140)=9.41, 
p<.001.                    
  In terms of the LRFu scale, the addition of IQ made only a small change to 82 
 
the proportion of variance in LRFU score explained by the model. Together PAI-
BOR and LHA scores accounted for 44% of the variance in LRFu score, R
2=.44, 
F(2,132)=50.46, p<.001. However, only PAI-BOR was a significant predictor of 
LRFu score, b= .32, t(134)=-4.14, p<.001.             
  PAI-BOR was a significant predictor of LRFc score, b= -.57, t(130)=-5.70, 
p<.001, but LHA was not. The model accounted for 28% of the variance in LRFc 
score, R
2=.28, F(2,132)=25.19, p<.001.           
  In order to test the second hypothesis, that level of psychopathy is related to 
severity of personality disorder traits, a one way analysis of variance was 
conducted. There was a significant effect of group on psychopathy score, 
F(2,142)=15.62, p<.001. The ASPD group scored highest on the SRPS (M=72.63, 
SD=12.70) followed by the BPD group (M=67.21, SD=13.44). The control group 
scored the lowest on the SRPS (M=57.81, SD-10.54). Tukey’s post-hoc 
comparisons suggested the ASPD group score was significantly higher than the 
control group, p<.001 as did the BPD group, p<.001. The differences between the 
two personality disorder groups were not significant. Correlations were performed in 
order to test the hypothesis that psychopathy would co-vary with severity of 
personality pathology (see table 9). 
Table 9 
Correlations Between Psychopathy and ASPD and Borderline traits 
 
LHA  PAI-BOR 
SRPS  .54**  .50** 
SRPS primary  .18*  .34** 
SRPS secondary  .64**  .75** 
**p<.001      *p<.05 
     
Total SRPS score had significant moderate positive correlations with both 
borderline, r=.50, p<.001, and ASPD traits, r=.54, p<.001. When this was broken 
down into the two psychopathy subscales the strongest correlation was between the 
secondary subscale of the SRPS and the PAI-BOR. To further explore the predictive 83 
 
power of personality pathology in terms of psychopathy score a linear regression 
was performed (see table 10). 
Table 10 
    Regression analyses of SRPS secondary subscale and severity of PD traits 
Dependent variable  Independent variables 
Variance in DV accounted 
for 
SRPS secondary 
subscale 
LHA* 
59%  PAI-BOR** 
PAI-BOR**  57% 
**Significant predictor p<.001     *Significant predictor p<.05 
PAI-BOR, b= .60, t(136)=8.09, p<.001 and LHA, b=.22, t(136)=2.93, p<.05   were 
both significant predictors of psychopathy score and together accounted for 59% of 
the variance in psychopathy score, R
2=.59, F(2,138)=98.05, p<.001. When LHA was 
removed from the model, PAI-BOR alone accounted for 57% of the variance in 
psychopathy score, R
2=.57, F(2,138)=177.65, p<.001.       
  In order to inform the hypothesis that psychopathy score would covary with 
mentalizing ability, correlations were carried out between the SRPS and its primary 
and secondary subscales, and the three mentalizing measures (table 11). In the 
case of the MASC and LRFu, partial correlations were conducted to control for the 
effect of IQ.  
Table 11 
      Correlations Between Psychopathy and Mentalisation  
   LRFc  LRFu  MASC 
SRPS total  -.35**  .36**  -.30** 
SRPS primary factor  -.12  .07  -.22* 
SRPS secondary factor   -.55**  .62**  -.29** 
** p<.001    * p<.01    
   
Total psychopathy score had small but significant correlations with all MASC 
measures. The negative correlation with LRFc, r=-.35, p<.001, suggests that as 
psychopathy increases, certainty about mental states of self and other decreases. 
The positive correlation between SRPS and the LRFu scale, r=-.32, p<.001suggests 84 
 
that as psychopathy scores increase, mentalizing deficit also increases, and MASC 
scores decrease, r=-.30, p<.001. Interestingly, the primary factor of the SRPS did 
not correlate with any mentalizing measure, other than a modest negative 
correlation with the MASC, r=-.22, p=.007, whereas the secondary factor had small 
to moderate significant correlations with all measures of mentalizing. These findings 
support the two factor theory of psychopathy, and suggest that a mentalizing deficit 
may be more related to secondary than primary psychopathy. In order to further 
explore this hypothesis, a linear regression was conducted. Guided by the results of 
correlational analyses, LRFu was selected as the dependent outcome, and the 
secondary subscale of the SRPS was entered as a predictor (table 12). 
 
 
Table 12 
    Regression Analyses of SRPS Secondary Subscale and Severity of PD Traits 
Dependent variable  Independent variables 
Variance in DV 
accounted for 
LRFu 
SRPS secondary subscale** 
43%  SRPS total* 
SRPS secondary subscale**  39% 
**significant predictor p<.001   *significant predictor p<.01 
 The secondary subscale of the SRPS was a significant predictor of LRFu score, 
b=.62,t(133)=9.12,p<.001, and accounted for 39% of the variance in LRFu score, 
R
2=.39, F(1,134)=83.25,p<.001. The amount of variance accounted for when total 
SRPS was entered into the model increased only slightly, to 43%, 
R
2=..43,F(2,134)=49.85,p<.001. SRPS total was also a significant predictor of LRFu 
score, b=-.34,t(133)=-3.24, p=.002. 
4. Discussion                
  The results suggest that those with a diagnosis of BPD do experience a 
mentalizing deficit compared to non clinical controls, providing support for the 
mentalizing model of BPD (Fonagy & Bateman, 2008). Borderline pathology was 85 
 
predictive of mentalizing ability, particularly as measured by the LRFu subscale, 
suggesting that severity of borderline traits predicts level of uncertainty about mental 
states of self and others. The strongest predictor of MASC score was IQ score, 
suggesting that this may not be a useful measure of mentalizing. In terms of ASPD 
the data supports a modest relationship with mentalizing deficit. Whilst the ASPD 
group’s scores were lower than controls and mentalizing subscales were 
significantly correlated with ASPD traits, as measured by the LHA, regression 
analyses did not find LHA score to be significant predictors of mentalizing deficit.  
  As expected, the ASPD group had the highest psychopathy scores. An 
interesting finding was that the BPD group’s psychopathy scores were also 
significantly higher than the control group. The link between BPD and psychopathy 
was further supported when BPD traits were explored as a continuous trait measure. 
As BPD pathology increased, so did psychopathic traits. This contributes towards 
the debate in the literature as to whether BPD may represent a phenotypic 
expression of psychopathy (Sprague et al., 2012) however the overlap between the 
measures has been highlighted previously (e.g. Dolan & Coid,1993). The two 
personality disorder groups did not differ significantly in terms of psychopathy score. 
The failure to find a difference between the two personality groups could be 
interpreted as providing support for the tenet that ASPD and BPD are 
representations of expressions of a collection of trait dimensions rather than distinct 
categorical entities (Paris, 1997). Some differences, however, were revealed when 
regression analyses were conducted to explore the predictive power of ASPD and 
BPD traits in terms of psychopathy score.            
  As described above, regression analyses supported BPD trait pathology as a 
significant predictor of mentalizing deficit, whereas LHA was not a significant 
predictor of any index of mentalizing, although it did correlate significantly with all 
three measures. This finding could be interpreted as evidence of a mentalizing 
deficit in ASPD. It is also possible that the modest statistical findings are affected by 86 
 
the fact that “ASPD” may be comprised of many different trait dimensions. Previous 
research suggests that those meeting criteria for ASPD actually represent a 
heterogeneous and diverse group consisting of various subtypes. Studies have used 
factors such as internalizing and externalizing psychopathology, impulsivity, 
aggression and violent offending to further validate these subtypes (Poythress et al., 
2010; Cox et al., 2013). At least two subtypes are well replicated in the literature and 
theoretically map onto primary and secondary psychopathy. Primary psychopathy, 
relates to the “classic” psychopath first described by Robert Hare as cold, callous, 
unemotional (Hare & Hart, 1993). This group are low in anxiety and are more likely 
to engage in instrumental aggression, their ability to understand the mental states of 
others does not differ from controls (Blair et al., 1996). Secondary psychopaths, the 
literature suggests, are characterised by higher internalizing and externalizing 
psychopathology, and are more impulsive and likely to engage in reactive 
aggression as a result of emotional dysregulation (Lykken, 1995). The data from the 
current study provide further support for the heterogeneity of antisocial personality 
pathology. Severity of psychopathy was related to increasing mentalizing deficit and 
this variance in mentalizing was best accounted for by the secondary factor of 
psychopathy. This finding supports the two factor theory of psychopathy, perhaps 
with secondary psychopathy representing a deficit in mentalizing as a result of 
emotional dysregulation. The current finding, that mentalizing deficit was most 
apparent in secondary psychopaths, could be interpreted as replication of the 
previous failure to find a theory of mind deficit in primary psychopathy (Dolan & 
Fullam, 2004). The findings from the current study provide some contribution 
towards the ongoing debate in the literature as to whether ASPD and psychopathy 
are distinct. The data supports, to some extent, the two as different expressions of a 
variety of trait dimensions rather than terms that can be used interchangeably, as 
they have in the past. Further replication is needed with more even sample sizes. 
  The categorical system of personality disorders adopted by the DSM has 87 
 
been criticised for high comorbidity, arbitrary cutoffs, and poor validity and reliability 
(e.g Verheul, 2006). The potential move towards a dimensional system has been 
debated in the literature for many years (Widiger & Samuel, 2005) particularly in the 
context of the recent revision of the DSM 5 (APA, 2013). One area of the literature 
that can inform this debate stems from Joel Paris’ research into whether ASPD and 
BPD are distinct, or rather different representations of a set of trait dimensions such 
as impulsivity and emotional dysregulation (Paris, 1997; 2004). Most recently it was 
concluded that ASPD and BPD are distinct disorders which share overlapping trait 
dimensions and risk factors.  The current study utilised both group and dimensional 
measures of ASPD and BPD pathology and compared them on trait dimensions of 
mentalizing, and psychopathy. A failure to find group differences between BPD and 
ASPD on these trait dimensions provide support for the overlap between the two 
disorders highlighted by Paris. When measured as continuous traits, borderline 
pathology was predictive of mentalizing ability. The finding that the ASPD group did 
not significantly differ from the BPD group in terms of mentalizing deficit or 
psychopathy score provides further support for the view of BPD and ASPD as two 
phenotypic expressions of one set of traits, as posited by Paris (1997). It is 
acknowledged that the failure to find these group differences could be related to the 
small ASPD sample size and therefore replication is required.      
  The results support the reliability of non resource intensive, easy to 
administer measures of mentalization, borderline and antisocial personality traits, 
with good internal consistency indicated for most of the scales used.  The primary 
and secondary subscales of the SRPS had poor internal consistency within this 
sample, therefore findings on psychopathy should be interpreted with caution. 
Severity of BPD and ASPD pathology as continuous measures yielded significant 
results in terms of predicting other constructs such as mentalizing deficit and 
psychopathy, which supports the utility of a dimensional approach to personality 
disorder research.                 88 
 
  A challenge of the current study was one that has been cited as a criticism of 
the categorical approach adopted by the DSM (Sarkar & Duggan, 2010) which is the 
issue of comorbidity. Many participants recruited for the study met criteria for both 
BPD and ASPD and indeed for other personality disorders. A weakness in the 
methodology is that AXIS I disorders were not controlled for.    
  Another limitation of the current study is that group sizes were very uneven. 
Difficulties in recruiting from probation services led to a small sample of ASPD 
participants. The current study used psychopathy as a trait dimension on which 
participants with and without diagnoses of ASPD and BPD varied. A difficulty in the 
study of psychopathy is that even those rating highly on measures of psychopathy 
may not meet criteria for psychopathy on a gold standard measure such as the PCL-
R and therefore it would be important to replicate these findings with a larger ASPD 
sample size. In a larger sample it would be more likely that people representing the 
full spectrum of psychopathy are captured.          
  This study attempts to measure the construct of mentalization in order to test 
the mentalizing deficit hypothesis of BPD, and explore this deficit in antisocial 
populations. The mentalization theory of BPD explains that individuals may switch 
into and out of a “mentalizing mode”, and that problems arise during emotional 
dysregulation where mentalizing capacity is reduced. By this account, mentalisation 
is not a stable personality trait which can be easily measured via self report. This 
also raises the issue of the effect of emotional states of participants on their task 
performance, particularly for those with a diagnosis of BPD. In those participants it is 
likely that the demands of the testing, combined with existing emotional 
dysregulation, and other likely factors such as disturbed sleep could have impacted 
on task performance. The data described here were drawn from a larger study, 
which required participants to complete a large battery of measures beyond those 
described here over the course of two lengthy sessions. The demands of the testing 
sessions may have influenced task performance due to boredom, frustration, 89 
 
tiredness or difficulty concentrating.           
  The original intention was to measure  ASPD pathology is by adding the 
number of ASPD items on the SCID-II that were endorsed to create a total score. 
This would provide a continuous variable of ASPD pathology. Unfortunately there 
was insufficient SCID-II data available and therefore the LHA scale was used as a 
continuous measure of antisocial behaviour. It contains three subscales that map 
onto the SCID-II criteria. It does not just cover physical aggression but accounts for 
other factors which are included in the SCID-II criteria for ASPD, such as school and 
employment disciplinary problems, criminal behaviour not resulting in contact with 
police such as driving whilst intoxicated. It is acknowledged that the LHA scale is not 
widely used as a measure of severity of ASPD pathology. It would be interesting to 
replicate these findings with the use of the ASPD subscale of the PAI.    
  The current findings provide support for the continued development of non 
resource intensive self report tools measuring mentalizing ability. Therapies focusing 
on increasing the ability to mentalize are becoming increasingly used in NHS 
personality disorder services and further research into the validity of the construct of 
mentalizing and how it is measured is necessary in order to inform and evaluate 
these treatments. These findings are also relevant to the assessment of individuals 
in terms of their suitability for mentalizing based treatment. Rather than assume that 
all “antisocial” individuals would benefit from such a treatment it is important to 
assess mentalizing ability on an individual level.        
  There has been a historical tendency to consider all “antisocial” individuals 
as one distinct category, with the terms “ASPD” and “psychopathy” often being used 
interchangeably. The current findings provide some support for the position that 
these disorders may be better understood as a variety of trait continuums. At the 
very least these data support distinction between two factors of “psychopathy”. The 
data support the existence of a primary, more cold, callous, unemotional subtype 
with less of a difficulty in mentalizing and a secondary, more impulsive subtype with 90 
 
more of a mentalizing deficit. The former may represent a group that have been 
previously found to have enhanced mentalizing ability, as displayed by those scoring 
highly on psychopathy who require these skills in order to deceive and exploit others 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2006). This suggests that a more formulation based approach 
to assessment and treatment of those with antisocial personality disorder traits may 
be appropriate than the current categorical system. The addition of a new 
dimensional-categorical hybrid model of personality disorder to the DSM-V calls for 
more research into the utility and validity of a dimensional model. The current study 
contributes towards the body of data supporting the utility of a dimensional model of 
personality traits, with personality disorders representing extreme ends of various 
dimensions rather than as separate categorical entities. Significant differences 
between BPD and ASPD groups were not revealed in terms of trait dimensions such 
as mentalizing ability and primary and secondary psychopathy. Whilst unequal 
sample size is an issue, the failure to find these group differences could also be 
interpreted as evidence to support the tenet that they in fact do not represent two 
distinct groups.  
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1. Introduction                 
  The following is a reflection on the process of conducting the research 
presented in this thesis. The advantages and disadvantages of conducting research 
as a part of a large scale existing research project are considered. Ethical and risk 
issues associated with conducting this research with a population of people with a 
diagnosis of personality disorder are presented. The methodological issue of 
recruiting and conducting research in organisations outside of the NHS such as the 
London Probation Service is discussed in relation to the challenges that arose whilst 
recruiting for this study. The conceptual issues of measuring personality traits, and 
refining the measurement of “mentalizing” are discussed. Finally the clinical 
implications of a dimensional model of personality disorder are discussed in relation 
to assessment, treatment and future research.  
2. Working as part of a large scale existing research project   
  Having worked with and conducted postgraduate level research in the area 
of psychopathy before, this project appealed to my interests. The potential for a 
large clinical sample was particularly appealing, as my previous research had been 
limited to the study of personality traits in community samples. The study had many 
benefits, such as being well funded by a large grant from The Wellcome Trust, 
awarded to Professors Peter Fonagy and Read Montague. The project had links 
with clinical and probation services, and approximately ten other students collecting 
data at any one time. The large number of researchers, combined with the funding 
which allowed for financial incentives for participants, guaranteed a respectable 
sample size.  Another benefit of working on an already established project was that 
ethical approval had already been granted, which meant that I could begin data 
collection at an early stage. This project also afforded the opportunity to gain 
experience in clinical and probation settings, and gain specialist knowledge in 
personality disorder. I would also have the opportunity to be trained in using 100 
 
instruments such as the Structured Clinical Inventory for Axis-II Personality 
Disorders (SCID-II, First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams & Benjamin, 1997) and the Adult 
Attachment Interview (AAI, George, Kaplan & Main, 1985), and also gain experience 
in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).           
  Along with the benefits of joining a well funded and established research 
project, this was balanced with the challenges of having limited influence over the 
methodology and measures which would inform my project. The lead of the study, a 
computational neuroscientist, aimed to explore the neural networks of individuals 
with and without personality disorder using fMRI techniques, which have previously 
revealed differing patterns of brain activity in ASPD and BPD (Völlm et al., 2004).  
Therefore these interests were prioritised over the more psychological aspects of 
the study that were of relevance to myself. In exchange for our gathering data for 
the study we would receive access to the database of behavioural measures, but 
not fMRI data or data from the battery of computerised tasks. The larger study 
aimed to measure a very large number of factors, which continued to increase as 
the study progressed. Due to the large amount of questionnaire, interview, and 
computerised tasks to be completed, some of which took place in an fMRI scanner, 
the testing procedure was very long. This also sacrificed the quality of some of the 
data of interest to my project. For example, SCIDs were not administered to all 
participants, data was often incomplete due to time constraints, and the ASPD 
subscale of the PAI was not administered, which meant that this had to be replaced 
by the Life History of Aggression scale (LHA, Coccaro, Berman & Kavoussi, 1997) in 
my analysis. Whilst having a large number of researchers gathering data was 
reassuring in terms of having a sufficient number of participants, this also raises 
issues such as inter-rater reliability and increased likelihood of inconsistency in the 
administration of the tests.              
  The lengthy testing procedures required each participant to attend sessions 
on two separate days, each lasting three to four hours. Participants were required to 101 
 
complete lengthy and repetitive computerised tasks, designed by researchers on the 
larger study.  Participants were also required to complete a very large questionnaire 
pack, the Raven’s IQ test, which is again very lengthy and repetitive, amongst 
several other measures. It would be easy to imagine any participant becoming bored 
during the testing, and finding it difficult to concentrate. It is possible that this 
affected the quality of the data.              
  A major component of the overarching research study was a battery of 
computerised games, the “social exchange battery”. This required each participant 
to play against a computerised opponent in several different tasks involving 
investing, gambling, buying and selling. Points won or lost were converted into real 
financial reward which was added to the hourly rate earned by participants. These 
tasks were very repetitive, and required each participant to concentrate for several 
hours at a time. Task instructions were long and complex, taking participants around 
20-30 minutes to read prior to the start of the study. Some participants struggled to 
understand the instructions and seemed somewhat frustrated. Others became very 
involved in the task and expressed frustration at the “opponent”, who essentially in 
some cases controlled the amount of actual money the participant would receive. I 
wondered whether the task length, complexity, and the competitive nature of the 
task could have an impact on participants’ mood state to the extent that their 
responses to other measures were impacted.  
3. Recruitment from probation and personality disorder services   
  My original interest in the project was focused more on the antisocial 
personality disorder aspect of the study as opposed to the borderline personality 
disorder sample. My literature review was very much focused on this area as were 
my research questions for the empirical paper. The process of testing participants 
brought me into contact with staff and service users from personality disorder 
services, and I became increasingly interested in borderline personality disorder, 102 
 
and eventually requested and was granted a year-long specialist placement in one 
of the services from which the study recruits. I then became more heavily involved in 
the recruitment process, and was able to recruit many participants both through my 
colleagues in the service and directly through my own clinical work. It was not 
difficult to recruit from the service, most participants were very attracted by the 
financial remuneration and some were interested in keeping images from the fMRI.
  Recruitment from probation services, however, was not so straightforward. 
Firstly, the political context cannot be ignored. At the time that recruitment from 
probation was taking place, probation services in the UK were undergoing and 
continue to undergo major organisational changes due to privatisation of offender 
management services (Ministry of Justice, 2013). This added pressure, on top of the 
existing demands of offender managers was likely to mean that recruiting for this 
study was perhaps a low priority for probation workers. This could be addressed in 
future similar projects by a more proactive recruitment strategy, which has been 
used successfully in previous research in these settings (Newbury-Helps, 2011). 
The probation service is still in a transitional period after The Bradley Report 
(Bradley, 2009) recommended a new interdepartmental strategy for managing 
personality disorder, and it is hoped that as this collaboration between the NHS and 
criminal justice system develops there will be more opportunity for research of this 
kind.                    
  The study did not benefit from direct links with clinical staff on these sites, as 
with the NHS services and therefore an alternative recruitment strategy was 
employed by the overarching study. This strategy was intended to identify potential 
participants who were most likely to meet criteria for ASPD. A database is used by 
the probation service, the Offender Assessment System (OAsys). Within this 
database are 12 variables, such as childhood disturbance, impulsivity, and 
aggression which highlight an increased likelihood of the need for assessment for 
ASPD (Minoudis, Shaw, Bannerman & Craissati, 2012). This system was used to 103 
 
put forward the names of those deemed at increased risk of meeting criteria for 
ASPD to project supervisors. Due to confidentiality issues which are pertinent when 
working across organisations, researchers were not provided with contact details for 
offenders. The strategy employed by the larger study was to approach the relevant 
offender managers, who were then tasked with passing on recruitment information 
to the relevant offenders or informing us when their next meeting would be so that 
someone from the project could attend, and wait to speak with them when they 
attended the probation office for their appointment. Offender managers have busy 
caseloads and may work across different locations, and as such it was difficult to 
contact them via telephone. Each offender manager’s caseload frequently changed, 
with offenders moving on from the area, or returning to prison. Often by the time the 
offender manager was contacted, they were no longer in contact with those 
offenders identified from the database. The next task was for a project worker who 
managed the testing sessions to contact them to arrange an appointment and 
arrange for their travel. This was important as appointments had to account for 
availability of researchers such as myself, and radiographers for those taking part in 
the fMRI procedure. On several occasions there was great difficulty getting into 
contact with the participant. They were often living somewhat chaotic lives, attending 
many appointments and did not have mobile telephones. The characteristics of 
ASPD include impulsivity and irresponsibility, and therefore these issues are to be 
expected when recruiting from this population. These individuals were also facing 
the challenge of adapting to life in the community after having served a prison 
sentence coupled with the demands of their probation order. When this is taken into 
consideration it is unsurprising that there was a difficulty in recruiting from probation 
services to central London for two long appointments.       
  Due to these difficulties with recruitment of those likely to meet criteria for 
ASPD the focus of the empirical paper shifted somewhat away from that described 
in the literature review towards incorporating BPD. The early stages of planning my 104 
 
project took place in the lead up to the revision of the DSM-IV. It seemed likely that 
there would be significant changes in the way that personality disorder was 
conceptualised, with a move away from the categorical classification system 
towards a dimensional approach to the conceptualisation of personality disorders 
(Krueger, Skodol, Livesley, Shrout & Huang, 2007). This influenced my decision to 
design my project around exploring personality traits as continuous variables rather 
than categorical entities. Eventually these changes were rejected. However the 
appendix to DSM-5 was added, proposing a new synthesised categorical-
dimensional approach, aimed to encourage research in this area. This provided 
support for the relevance of the approach of my empirical paper. 
4. Ethical and risk issues             
  Deliberate self harm and parasuicidal behaviours are common in BPD. 
Recurrent suicidal threats and gestures have been considered a core feature of the 
disorder and place great demands on mental health services (Black, Blum, Pfohl & 
Hale, 2004). A history of suicide attempts has also been found to be related to 
ASPD diagnosis (Verona, Patrick & Joiner, 2001). Around three quarters of people 
with a diagnosis will attempt suicide, and 10 will complete (Paris & Zweig-Frank, 
2001). Around 80% of women with a diagnosis of BPD have engaged in self 
mutilating behaviour (Shearer, Peters, Quaytman & Wadman, 1988). One of the key 
services recruited from was a specialist personality disorder therapy service. This 
service works exclusively with clients at high risk of self harming and suicidal 
behaviours.  Clinical training and experience had prepared me for working with 
clients in distress and managing risk of harm. However working with risk issues in a 
research capacity presented different challenges. The larger study required the 
administration of the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI, George, Kaplan & Main, 
1985). This interview requires participants to describe their earliest memories of 
attachment relationships and explores their childhood and adolescent experiences 105 
 
of these relationships, including interview questions about loss and trauma. Many 
participants became tearful during this interview, including control participants, many 
of which had experienced some form of emotional trauma at a young age. Despite 
the increased risk associated with emotional dysregulation in those diagnosed with 
BPD, this risk was well managed. A risk protocol was created by the NHS for the 
larger study. This included advice for researchers on how to support participants in 
tolerating distress and a handout for participants which included some relaxation 
strategies, and some contact numbers should they need further support in managing 
their distress. The added benefit was that all BPD participants were attached to a 
therapy service and therefore had an assigned clinician who could also provide 
support and be contact in the event of a risk situation. The control group, however, 
also exhibited some distress when discussing loss or trauma, understandably. They 
did not benefit from having an assigned therapist or being attached to a service, 
although they did receive the same debriefing procedure as clinical participants and 
were also encouraged to contact identified individuals for further support if required. 
5. The construct of “mentalizing”           
  The empirical paper focuses on the construct of mentalizing, which is defined 
as a form of social cognition, the ability to understand and form representations of 
our own and others’ mental states (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). The mentalizing deficit 
theory of BPD posits that a failure to form these representations is linked to 
emotional dysregulation in BPD. This theory forms the basis of mentalization based 
therapy (MBT) which is now a National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2009) 
recommended treatment for borderline personality disorder, which has been shown 
to be effective in a randomised control trial in terms of reduced  BPD 
symptomatology at 18 month follow-up (Bateman & Fonagy, 1999). Despite the 
successes of MBT, research is still attempting to clarify and measure the construct 
of mentalizing. Mentalizing is a broad and multifaceted construct (Choi-Kain & 106 
 
Gunderson, 2008), perhaps overlapping with multiple constructs such as social 
cognition and theory of mind. Another difficulty of refining the measurement of 
mentalization is that it may not represent a stable trait, more a “mode” that we switch 
in and out of. It is theorized that in BPD a mentalizing deficit is only apparent once 
the attachment system has been activated (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006).  This 
presents a challenge to researchers wishing to measure and improve the construct 
validity of mentalizing ability. Three measures were employed in the current study. 
The Movie Assessment for Social Cognition (MASC, Dziobeck et al., 2006) requires 
the participant to answer questions as to the thoughts and feelings of a set of 
fictional characters. The movie itself is clearly outdated, and the characters speak in 
German with an English voiceover. It is unlikely that participants emotionally 
connected to the material, and rather it is a test of mind reading ability and 
understanding of a storyline. Previous research, (Newbury-Helps, 2011), along with 
the current study, show that MASC scores are affected by IQ and therefore perhaps 
this is not a particularly useful measure of mentalizing ability. The Reflective 
Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ-54, Fonagy & Ghinai, unpublished) is an as yet 
unpublished scale. The subscales utilised in the empirical paper were advised in 
personal communication with the author, Peter Fonagy, and require further 
validation. It was advised that the RFQ-54 is a deficit measure, meaning that the 
higher the score, the higher the mentalizing deficit. The LRFu subscale measures a 
deficit in terms of being unsure about the mental states of self and others. The LRFc 
subscale relates to being certain of the mental states of others. It was unclear at 
which point being certain of the mental states of others represents a deficit, in other 
words, how certain is too certain? As one would expect, where one score correlated 
positively with LRFu, it correlated negatively with LRFc. This intuitively makes 
sense, as one becomes more uncertain of something, they become less certain of it. 
Clearly these subscales need further refinement and investigation.  107 
 
6. Measuring personality                
  A challenge in the area of personality research as we move towards a 
dimensional model of personality disorder is measuring non-categorical traits. 
Researchers are faced with the challenge of developing measures that capture what 
they are intending to measure. Originally the plan for the current study was to take 
the number of SCID-II items endorsed for ASPD and BPD, ie those that were 
assigned a score of three, and totalling the number of items to create a continuous 
score which would indicate severity of BPD and ASPD pathology. The use of the 
SCID-II has been criticised for high levels of comorbidity (Verheul, 2006). The 
problem of comorbidity was noted anecdotally whilst working on the study, when it 
was noticed that many participants were endorsing criteria that would meet the 
cutoff point to indicate diagnosable personality disorders. As I learned over the 
course of this project in my own clinical work with personality disorder, “ticking the 
boxes” on the SCID-II is not sufficient to indicate a diagnosable personality disorder 
and a certain level of clinical judgment is necessary. The traits must be pervasive 
across time, and problematic for the individual across different domains of life, such 
as relationships and occupation (DSM-5, APA, 2013). It has been highlighted that 
the SCID-II has taken a system used for assessing more easily categorised axis-I 
disorders and attempted to apply it to the diagnosis of axis-II personality disorders 
(Westen, 1997) by asking direct questions to individuals about traits which they may 
lack the insight or knowledge to describe. When used as a research tool, as in the 
current study, the SCID-II is especially reliant on direct descriptions of participants in 
the absence of any corroborative information, clinical interview or previous 
therapeutic relationship. In the current study researchers were not all trained clinical 
and many had minimal diagnostic experience, further reducing its’ reliability. Given 
these issues it was decided that SCID data would not provide a reliable dimensional 
measure of PD pathology. Fortunately the overarching study included the PAI-BOR 
in its questionnaire battery. The PAI-BOR is a well validated scale with good 108 
 
psychometric properties.               
  The measurement of antisocial traits is highly complex and represents a 
debate spanning decades and a large body of literature, as explored in detail in the 
literature review in part one of this thesis. In the past there has been a tendency to 
use the terms psychopathy and ASPD interchangeably. Increasingly, as concluded 
by the literature review, evidence suggests that to consider everyone meeting 
diagnostic criteria for ASPD as a categorical entity, would be, as suggested by 
Henry & Moffitt (1998) “to compare apples and oranges”. It is crucial that future 
research is careful to consider what is being measured when we are measuring 
ASPD pathology, and to avoid the pitfalls of reification of what previous and current 
research has found to be a diverse group of people.        
   In terms of measuring ASPD pathology, the intention was to use the ASPD 
subscale of the PAI. Unfortunately, due to the overarching study being out of my 
control, this scale was not administered for all subjects. Large amounts of missing 
data meant that this could not be used. The decision was made to replace it with 
another scale that was administered as part of the overarching study, the life history 
of aggression scale (LHA, Coccaro, Berman & Kavoussi, 1997). This consists of 
three subscales measuring aggression, antisocial behaviour/consequences, and self 
directed aggression.  
7. Clinical implications               
  The current study adds to the growing body of literature which proposed a 
move towards a dimensional model of personality disorder (Krueger et al., 2007) in 
the context of the recent addition of a hybrid dimensional-categorical model of 
personality disorder in the DSM-5. If this approach were to be adopted this would 
have implications for the assessment of PD in clinical practise.  It has been 
suggested that a dimensional approach would present clinical challenges due to the 
lack of cutoff points which are currently used by clinicians to make decisions, for 109 
 
example about treatment and access to services (Widiger & Trull, 2007). 
Conversely, it is argued that a dimensional model could provide multiple cut off 
points which can be used to make different clinical decisions (Trull, 2005). An 
assessment process has been proposed (Widiger & Trull, 2007) which would involve  
initial assessment of trait dimensions using self report measures, which would then 
inform further assessment as to the extent of social and occupational impairment 
related to these traits. Decisions on the clinical significance of these traits would 
then be decided using a tool such as the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF, 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The GAF has been shown to have good 
reliability even after brief training (Startup, Jackson & Bendix, 2002), whereas 
existing categorical cutoff points which are used an indices of clinical levels of 
impairment are somewhat arbitrary. Diagnosis based on examining a variety of trait 
dimensions could have more clinical utility in terms of providing specific treatment 
implications.                  
  The study of mentalization is particularly relevant in ASPD given the lack of a 
robust evidence for effective treatments in this area (McMurran, 2002). Due to a lack 
of evidence and perhaps a “sense of therapeutic pessimism” (McGauley, Yakeley, 
Williams & Bateman, 2011) frequent in clinicians towards this client group,  those 
assessed and assigned a categorical diagnosis of ASPD may not be accepted for 
treatment in personality disorder services. However given that there is growing 
evidence, supported by the current study that BPD and ASPD may represent shared 
trait dimensions, such as impulsivity and emotional dysregulation, there is hope that 
treatments designed for BPD may also be shown to be beneficial for ASPD.  Based 
on the premise that ASPD is a developmental disorder characterised by disrupted 
attachment, and that mentalizing is also related to attachment, it was hypothesised 
that MBT may be an effective treatment for ASPD (McGauley et al., 2011). A pilot 
study of MBT for male outpatients with a diagnosis of ASPD revealed a decrease in 
severity of aggression towards self and others and symptom related distress. The 110 
 
current study supports that tenet that those meeting the current criteria for a 
diagnosis of ASPD represent a heterogeneous group, and therefore a more 
dimensional approach to assessment would more specifically inform treatment 
pathways. The current research further supports psychopathy as a variable trait 
dimension. Historically treatment outcomes are poorer with those at the low end of 
the anxious and emotional trait dimensions, who engage in less reactive aggression, 
may benefit less from treatment than others. This further highlights the importance 
of a formulation based, dimensional approach to clinical assessment rather than 
relying on categorical diagnoses.  
8. Future research                
  Research in the field of mentalization presents a challenge in that it is a 
broad and multifaceted concept, potentially consisting of several overlapping 
constructs such as theory of mind and social cognition. Measures of mentalizing are 
still in their infancy and many more studies are required in order to refine and 
empirically validate measures which are providing promise, such as the RFQ-54. 
Researchers should proceed with caution around certain measures which are 
heavily influenced by intellectual ability, such as the MASC. The mentalizing theory 
of BPD posits that the failure to mentalize is present only when the attachment 
system is activated (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006). In order to test this hypothesis 
research paradigms are required, in which mentalizing measures are administered 
prior to and after activation of the attachment system. This requires careful 
consideration of ethical and risk factors. In terms of ASPD, the results described in 
the empirical study require replication with a larger sample size in order to further 
clarify how mentalization deficits may or may not manifest in those with ASPD. MBT 
may represent a promising treatment modality for ASPD, however much more 
robust empirical research is required in order to further establish the possible role of 
mentalizing in ASPD. The current study did not account for attachment status, as 111 
 
coding of the AAI data collected is yet to be completed. Given the hypothesis 
presented by McGauley et al. (2011), that mentalizing deficits in ASPD may be a 
function of early attachment relationships, it will be important for future research into 
the link between ASPD pathology and mentalizing to take attachment into 
consideration.                    
9. Summary                 
  Overall this project adds to a body of literature which represents a shift in the 
approach to assessment and treatment of personality disorder, an area which 
historically has been surrounded by some stigma amongst mental health 
professionals (Lewis & Appleby, 1988).It is hoped that research in this area 
continues to contribute towards promising treatments such as MBT. Increased 
understanding of the aetiology of ASPD and BPD may foster a more hopeful attitude 
in clinicians towards the treatment of personality disorder.       
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Appendix A1:  Quality appraisal Tool 
 
 
 
 
Criteria  Yes 
(2) 
Partial 
(1) 
No 
(0) 
n/a 
1  Question / objective sufficiently 
described? 
       
2  Study design evident and appropriate?         
3  Method of subject/comparison group 
selection or source of information/input 
variables described and appropriate? 
       
4  Subject (and comparison group, if 
applicable) characteristics sufficiently 
described? 
       
5  If interventional and random allocation 
was possible, was it described? 
       
6  If interventional and blinding of 
investigators was possible, was it 
reported? 
       
7  If interventional and blinding of subjects 
was possible, was it reported? 
       
8  Outcome and (if applicable) exposure 
measure(s) well defined and robust to 
measurement / misclassification bias? 
Means of assessment reported? 
       
9  Sample size appropriate?         
10  Analytic methods described/justified and 
appropriate? 
       
11  Some estimate of variance is reported for 
the main results? 
       
12  Controlled for confounding?         
13  Results reported in sufficient detail?         
14  Conclusions supported by the results?         
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Appendix A2: Results of Quality Appraisal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study  Score (max = 22) 
Poythress et al. (2010)  22 
Cox et al. (2013)  22 
Magyar et al. (2013)  18 
Coid & Ullrich (2010)  18 
Kosson et al. (2006)  22 
Dolan and Fullam (2004)  18 
Verona et al. (2012)  21 
Dolan (2012)  21 
De Brito et al. (2013)  20 
Vaidyanathan et al. (2011)  16 
Drislane et al. (2013)  20 
Gregory et al. (2012)  21 
Zeier et al. (2012)  19 119 
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Appendix B2: Participant Information Sheet 
  Version 1.4 
                                                                                        PD – 
CPA 
                                                                                                                          Personality Disorders – 
a Computational 
[Information Sheet; Clincial/Probation Service]                  
Psychiatry Approach 
     
Understanding the Social Brain in Healthy Volunteers and People 
with Psychological Difficulties. 
 
 
This study has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee for Wales (Project ID Number): 
12/WA/0283. 
We would like to invite you to participate in this research project.  
You are being invited to take part in a research study. You should only participate if you want to. Before 
you decide whether to take part, this sheet will give you some more information about why the study is 
being carried out, what you would be asked to do if you decide to take part, and how the study will be 
conducted.  Please take some time to read this sheet, and to discuss it with other people if you wish. You 
are also very welcome to ask any further questions about the study, or if you find anything on this sheet 
unclear.  
Why is this study being done? 
 
With the proposed project we plan to investigate the brain activation patterns of people suffering from 
personality  disorders  (both  in  adults  and  adolescents)  and  compare  them  with  healthy  control 
participants.  Only  little  is  known  about  the  neurobiology  of  Borderline  and  Antisocial  Personality 
Disorders. Our study design  will address some of these.  This will hopefully allow us  to gain a better 
understanding  of  the  disorders  and  to  develop  more  informed  and  effective  treatments  from  which 
clients will benefit.  
Why have you been invited to take part?   
You have been invited to take part in the study because you have recently been assessed at one of the 
clinical or probation services currently collaboration with the research team. 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. Taking part in the study is entirely voluntary. It is your choice whether or not you would like to 
participate. Deciding not to take part in the study will not affect the care you receive from services either 
now or in the future. If you do decide to participate, you will be given this information sheet to keep, and 
you will later be asked to sign a consent form stating that you wish to take part. If you do give consent to 
take part in the study, you are still free to leave the study at any point, without giving a reason. This will 
not affect the care you are currently receiving, or will receive in the future. If you leave, any information 
that we have already collected from you will be destroyed.  
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Appendix B3: Participant Consent Form 
                      
                              
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to 
an explanation about the research.  
 
Project Title:  
Understanding the Social Brain in Healthy 
Volunteers and People with Psychological 
Difficulties. 
This study has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee for Wales (Project ID): 
12/WA/0283. 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take part, the 
person organising the research must explain the project to you. 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to 
you, please ask the researcher before you to decide whether to join in.  You will be given a 
copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.  
 
Participant’s Statement  
I               
  have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet, and understand what 
the study involves. I am also aware that I can consent to certain aspects of the study 
in order to participate in them whereas I can withhold my consent for others parts. 
  understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this 
project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw immediately.  
  consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this 
research study. 
  understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled 
in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
  understand that some of the MRI data will be transferred for analysis to the Principal 
Investigator’s second laboratory at Virginia Tech University in the USA and will 
therefore no longer be subject to EEA data protection laws but that this data will be 
anonymised and no identifiable personal information will be shared or transferred.  
  agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my 
satisfaction and I agree to take part in this study.  
  I  agree  that  my  non-personal  research  data  may  be  used  by  others  for  future 
research. I am assured that the confidentiality of my personal data will be upheld 
through the removal of identifiers.  
  I understand that part of my participation will be audio-recorded (the interviews) and 
I consent to the anonymous use of this material as part of the project. 
  I agree to be contacted in the future by UCL researchers who would like to invite me 
to participate in follow-up studies. 125 
 
  I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and 
that I can request a copy.  Confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will 
not be possible to identify me from any publications. 
  I agree that the research team might re-contact me in case that additional data has 
to be obtained or for follow-up studies. 
 
Please initial the statements below if you agree with them:                                                                
Initial here 
 
I agree to take part in the general part of the PD-CPA study as outlined in the information  
Sheet and to all points listed above. 
(a separate consent for the MRI, tattoo component, and genetics component follows below). 
 
I agree to the audio recording of interviews and I consent to the anonymous use of this    
material as part of the project. 
 
I agree that some of the study data will be shared with the collaborating laboratory 
at Virginia Tech University in the USA. 
 
I understand that relevant sections of medical and or probation notes and data collected  
   
during my clinical assessment and during the study from me, may be  
looked at by individuals from the PD-CPA  research team, my clinician or 
from the NHS Trust, where it is relevant to our taking part in this research. I give 
permission for these individuals to have access to my records.  
I agree that the PD-CPA research team can contact me about coming in   
for up to two follow-up sessions over the next three years. 
 
I agree that I can be contacted after the end of this study about possible   
future research and follow-up with PD-CPA and related groups. 
 
I agree that my GP can be told that I am participating in this study. 
 
GP’s name: __________________  Surgery: _________________________ 
 
Address: ______________________________________________________  
 
 
MRI and Cognition: 
 
        
I agree to have an MRI scan and I understand what will happen in the scan. 
 
 
I have had an MRI safety check and I am confident that there is no reason 
why I can’t have a scan, such as a recent operation. 
 
   
I agree that my test results can be held by the Wellcome Trust and shared 
with other research groups, and I understand that this data will be anonymous 126 
 
and not contain any personal information. 
 
 
Genetics: 
 
You do not have to agree to provide blood or saliva samples to take part in the research. 
You do not have to agree that any samples you do give can be stored for future testing. 
By giving a sample, you consent to be contacted by BioResource about the possibility of 
joining their panel, but you are under no obligation to join BioResource. 
 
 
I agree to give a sample of blood and saliva (delete as appropriate) for medical research 
and for details about me and any samples I provide to be kept on a secure database. I agree 
that BioResource, the study collaborator on genetics, can store my samples and can contact  
me to invite me to join their panel.  
 
I agree that the samples and information I provide can be stored for use in    
future medical research, subject to ethical approval. 
 
I understand that I will not benefit financially if my samples are used in    
research leading to a new treatment or medical test being developed. 
 
In the unlikely event that an abnormality is picked up from tests carried out    
on my sample, I agree to be informed, and with my consent my GP can be told. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your help.  
 
By completing and returning this form, you are giving us your consent that the personal 
information you provide will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with 
the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
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Appendix B4: Participant Debrief Form 
 
Understanding the Social Brain in Healthy Volunteers and 
People with Psychological Difficulties. 
 
Thank you for taking part in our study, we appreciate that you gave up your time to take part 
and hope that you found it interesting. 
Summary of the Research Project 
The aim of our study is to understand how mind and brain work in order to better understand 
patients  with  psychological  difficulties.  We  hope  that  this  will  have  an  impact  on  the 
development of specific treatment interventions. 
Most of our tasks are designed to look at how we think about ourselves and others (called 
"mentalisation"),  how  we  regulate  our  emotions,  value  co-operation  or  experience  close 
relationships and how problems can sometimes develop in these relationships. 
Getting a better sense of the different strategies that people apply in these areas can help us 
understand more about when people experience mental health problems that can lead them 
to find certain social interactions and situations challenging. We hope to use these findings 
so that treatments can be tailored to help improve the domains where a patient’s difficulties 
may lie. 
We are also interested in how someone’s experiences in childhood and his or her parenting 
at that time impact on the performances in the tasks and the functioning of the brain areas 
that underpin them. For instance, the long interview can tell us more about the quality of your 
bonding with parents.  
Some of the topics discussed in the course of the study may have brought about thoughts or 
feelings which you had not previously considered or may have made you recall memories 
which could be perceived as distressing or lead you to feel tense or ruminate on thoughts. 
Therefore, we have provided some exercises at the back of this sheet which may help you to 
cope with any such feelings which you may experience. 
What to do if you continue to feel concerned 
If you continue to feel concerned after taking part in the study it may be useful to talk to a 
family member, a friend or your GP. Your Lead Clinician (care co-ordinator) or Probation 
Worker will also be able to support you, if you have one.  
In addition to this support there is also free and confidential advice provided by the Mental 
Health charity Mind which can be found on their website: http://www.mind.org.uk/ or by 
calling their advice line 0300 123 3393. 
If  you  feel  at  immediate  risk  do  not  hesitate  to  contact  Dr    (details 
overleaf). 
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Contact Details  
If  you  still  have  concerns  or  wish  to  contact  the  research  team  to  discuss  any  of  the 
information further or any concerns you have about the study, then please do so by getting in 
touch with the members of the research team listed below:  
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to read this 
information sheet. 
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Relaxation Exercises 
Progressive Muscle Relaxation Technique 
{Pause between instructions} 
 
Begin by finding a comfortable position either sitting or lying down in a 
location where you will not be interrupted.  
Allow your attention to focus only on your body. If you begin to notice your 
mind wandering, bring it back to the muscle you are working on.  
 
Take a deep breath through your abdomen, hold for a few seconds, and 
exhale slowly. Again, as you breathe notice your stomach rising and your 
lungs filling with air.  
 
As you exhale, imagine the tension in your body being released and flowing 
out of your body.  
And again inhale…..and exhale. Feel your body already relaxing.  
 
As you go through each step, remember to keep breathing .  
 
Now let’s begin. Tighten the muscles in your forehead by raising your 
eyebrows as high as you can. Hold for about five seconds. And abruptly 
release feeling that tension fall away.  
 
Now smile widely, feeling your mouth and cheeks tense. Hold for about 5 
seconds, and release, appreciating the softness in your face.  
 
Next, tighten your eye muscles by squinting your eyelids tightly shut. Hold for 
about 5 seconds, and release.  
 
Gently pull your head back as if to look at the ceiling. Hold for about 5 
seconds, and release, feeling the tension melting away.  
 
Now feel the weight of your relaxed head and neck sink.  
 
Breath in…and out.  
 
In…and out.  
 
Let go of all the stress  
 
In…and out.  130 
 
 
Now, tightly, but without straining, clench your fists and hold this position until 
I say stop. Hold for about 5 seconds, and release.  
 
Now, flex your biceps. Feel that buildup of tension. You may even visualize 
that muscle tightening.  
 
Hold for about 5 seconds, and release, enjoying that feeling of limpness.  
 
Breath in...and out.  
 
Now tighten your triceps by extending your arms out and locking your 
elbows. Hold for about 5 seconds, and release.  
 
Now lift your shoulders up as if they could touch your ears. Hold for about 5 
seconds, and quickly release, feeling their heaviness.  
 
Tense your upper back by pulling your shoulders back trying to make your 
shoulder blades touch.  
 
Hold for about 5 seconds, and release.  
 
Tighten your chest by taking a deep breath in, hold for about 5 seconds, and 
exhale, blowing out all the tension. 
 
Now tighten the muscles in your stomach by sucking in. Hold for about 5 
seconds, and release.  
 
Gently arch your lower back. Hold for about 5 seconds, relax.  
 
Feel the limpness in your upper body letting go of the tension and stress, 
hold for about 5 seconds, and relax.  
 
Tighten your buttocks. Hold for about 5 seconds…, release, imagine your 
hips falling loose.  
 
Tighten your thighs by pressing your knees together, as if you were holding a 
penny between them.  
 
Hold for about 5 seconds…and release.  
 
Now flex your feet, pulling your toes towards you and feeling the tension in 
your calves. Hold for about 5 seconds, and relax, feel the weight of your legs 
sinking down.  131 
 
 
Curl your toes under tensing your feet. Hold for about 5 seconds, release.  
 
Now imagine a wave of relaxation slowly spreading through your body 
beginning at your head and going all the way down to your feet.  
 
Feel the weight of your relaxed body.  
 
Breathe in…and out…in…out….in…out. 
 
 
Mindfulness Exercise 
Read the following instructions 
Sit comfortably, with your eyes closed and your spine reasonably straight.  
Bring your attention to your breathing.  
Imagine that you have a balloon in your tummy. Every time you breathe in, 
the balloon inflates. Each time you breathe out, the balloon deflates. Notice 
the sensations in your abdomen as the balloon inflates and deflates. Your 
abdomen rising with the in-breath, and falling with the out-breath.  
Thoughts will come into your mind, and that’s okay, because that’s just what 
the human mind does. Simply notice those thoughts, then bring your 
attention back to your breathing.  
Likewise, you can notice sounds, physical feelings, and emotions, and again, 
just bring your attention back to your breathing.  
You don’t have to follow those thoughts or feelings, don’t judge yourself for 
having them, or analyse them in any way. It’s okay for the thoughts to be 
there. Just notice those thoughts, and let them drift on by, bringing your 
attention back to your breathing.  
Whenever you notice that your attention has drifted off and is becoming 
caught up in thoughts or feelings, simply note that the attention has drifted, 
and then gently bring the attention back to your breathing.  
It's okay and natural for thoughts to enter into your awareness, and for your 
attention to follow them. No matter how many times this happens, just keep 
bringing your attention back to your breathing. 
 
 